an aggregate of sentiments—in short, a bundle of feelings. Conscience is of the heart, not of the head. It is simply the conglomeration of feelings which makes us feel good when we do right, and feel bad when we do wrong.[1]
In criticism of this view, we may urge (a) that feelings do not have the permanence that conscience possesses. Feelings are capricious and uncertain, varying from moment to moment. But conscience is constant and systematic, (b) Feelings are not reflective. Feelings give an immediate sense of value, but they cannot reflect on themselves or on anything else. But conscience is reflective. The fact that it often does not "prick" till after the action has been performed shows that its verdict is based on reflection.
But though both of these views as they stand are erroneous, they each contain an element of truth. (1) It is true that conscience is rational. Conscience is the self making moral judgments. And judgment is always rational. Conscience is often pictured as a kind of judge. It carries on judicial investigation, it accuses, it bears witness, and it passes sentence. In all these judicial operations the rational aspect of conscience is prominent. Conscience is simply intelligence occupied with a certain kind of subject-matter. Conscientious reflection is distinguished from reflection in general, not as a special kind of mental activity; but as dealing with a special class of objects. When intelligence deals with the rela-
- ↑ Varieties of this view have been maintained by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and by Hume, Mill, and Leslie Stephen; and more recently by Prof. Westermarck (The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas) and Dr. M'Dougall (Social Psychology).
