CHAPTER XVII.
that the logical art is necessary.
Since reason is the faculty which analyses[1] and perfects the rest, and it ought itself not to be unanalysed, by what should it be analysed? for it is plain that this should be done either by itself or by another thing. Either then this other thing also is reason, or something else superior to reason; which is impossible. But if it is reason, again who shall analyse that reason? For if that reason does this for itself, our reason also can do it. But if we shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity and have no end.[2] Reason therefore is analysed by itself. Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions[3]) and the like. Will you then hear about those things? Hear. But if you should say, "I know not whether you are arguing truly or falsely," and if I should express myself in any way ambiguously, and you should say to me, "Distinguish," I will bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, "It is more urgent."[4] This is the reason, I suppose, why they (the Stoic teachers) place the logical art first, as in the measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if we do not determine first what is a
- ↑ Λόγος ἐστὶν δ διαρθρῶν. Διαρθρούν means "to divide a thing into its parts or members." The word "analyse" seems to be the nearest equivalent. See Schweig.'s note on ὑπὸ τίνος διαρθρωθῇ ;
- ↑ This is obscure. The conclusion, "Reason therefore is analysed by itself" is not in Epictetus; but it is implied, as Schweighaeuser says (p. 197, notes). So Antoninus, xi. 1, writes: "These are the properties of the rational soul; it sees itself, analyses itself." If reason, our reason, requires another reason to analyse it, that other reason will require another reason to analyse that other reason; and so on to infinity. If reason then, our reason, can be analysed, it must be analysed by itself. The notes on the first part of this chapter in the edition of Schweighaeuser may be read by those who are inclined.
- ↑ "Our opinions." There is some defect in the text, as Wolf remarks. "The opponent," he says, "disparages Logic (Dialectic) as a thing which is not necessary to make men good, and he prefers moral teaching to Logic: but Epictetus informs him, that a man who is not a Dialectician will not have a sufficient perception of moral teaching."
- ↑ He repeats the words of the supposed opponent; and he means that his adversary's difficulty shows the necessity of Dialectic.
