made to each; that useless works would be proposed from the spirit of competition or individual interest; and that corruption, coëxtensive with the increase of power, would deprave the functions of the general Government. . . To an impartial observer it appears that Congress has no constitutional right to devote the public funds to internal improvements, at its own unrestricted will and pleasure; that the permitted usurpation of the power for so long a time indicates that some degree of such power in the hands of the general Government is desirable and necessary; that such power should be granted through an amendment of the constitution, by the methods therein provided; that, in the meantime, it is perilous that the instrument should be strained for the support of any function, however desirable its exercise may be.
"In case of the proposed addition being made to the constitution, arrangements will, of course, be entered into for determining the principles by which general are to be distinguished from local objects or whether such distinction can, on any principle, be
