LIFE AND MECHANISM. 47 gard as function in that whole what was taken to be action on the organism from without. When, therefore, we say that variations in the environment produce changes in the organism, we can mean no more than when we say that a surgical operation produces a reproduction of lost tissue. 1 It is thus an error to treat development as a process in which organisms are made what they are, or, which comes to the same thing, a process taking place in space and time. This latter statement may seem specially paradoxical ; but becomes perfect!} 7 intelligible as soon as it is realised that knowledge is not limited to what can be envisaged in space and time. The idea that abiogeuesis is possible or conceivable depends on the same transcendent use of the categories of physical science that is at the bottom of so many other misconcep- tions. So long as the organism is looked at from the point of view of physical science, it certainly cannot be supposed that there is any insuperable difficulty as to the origin of life from ordinary physical conditions. The whole question is assumed from the outset ; and the only real difficulty that can arise is that of drawing a line between the organic and inorganic. But if the contention of this article as to the nature of life is correct, it follows that it is as unreasonable to consider the possibility of the origin of life out of mechanical conditions, as it would be to consider the possi- bility of the origin of matter and energy from mere relations of time and space. We may trace the steps in the develop- ment of life back to the time when the solar system was in the gaseous state. But in thus retracing our steps we carry with us into phenomena which we had abstractly considered to be purely mechanical, the same conception that we originally started with. The want of a sufficient philosophical vocabulary in English has been a source of great difficulty in a discussion in which it was specially necessary to be clear as to the meaning of the expressions made use of. I have found it necessary to employ words, the use of which, if taken in their ordinary sense, would seem inconsistent. As it appears to be almost impossible for anyone who writes on philosophy in English to avoid such apparent inconsistencies, I have been forced to leave the context to determine in what sense a word is used at any particular place. 1 In Principles of Biology, pp. 451-457, Mr. Spencer discusses, in relation to the argument of The Origin of Species, what is really one aspect of the difficulty of a mechanical interpretation of evolution. I cannot, however, agree with Mr. Spencer's conclusions in the matter.
