Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 9.djvu/60

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

III.—THE METAPHYSICAL METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY.1[1]

I.

I propose to invite your attention this evening to the question of Method; whether there is a distinct and peculiar method in philosophy, and if so what it is. If there is such a thing as philosophy, it must have a method of its own; but at the present day it seems almost as if there was not such a thing. There are philosophies in abundance. There are the Spencerian philosophy, and the Hume and Mill line of speculation, in this country; there are Herr von Hartmann's philosophy, and the line of speculation known as "Theory of Knowledge," in Germany; there are Auguste Comte's Positive Philosophy, and M. Renouvier's Phenomenism, in France; there is the Scholastic Philosophy for the use of Catholics; these are all alive and vigorous; then there are some majestic ruins of philosophies, which still afford shelter to their respective votaries; besides which are several minor or less known philosophies, which it would be tedious to enumerate, each employed in battling for its own hand, to say nothing of various philosophies of common-sense, almost as numerous as individuals, which keep their horns very much within their own shells. But apparently there is no Philosophy; and a fortiori there is no method.

Truly a disheartening spectacle. And what is worse, if we look at its history, the confusion seems to increase rather than diminish. There appears to be but one fundamental conception, belonging to the old Scholastic philosophy, which is still held by all its modern derivatives, namely, that of the agency of substance. Those who discard this conception, as Hume did, fall ipso facto, it would seem, into philosophical scepticism, which is the antithesis of philosophy; while those who retain and build upon it diverge continually farther and farther from each other. Philosophers have now to face the question, whether this conception can or cannot be

justified as an assumption; and if not, whether philosophy, as opposed to philosophical scepticism, can or cannot exist and thrive without it. The metaphysical method in philosophy,

  1. 1 Address at the opening of the Session of the Edinburgh University Philosophical Society, November, 1883.