Brazos San Jago, that an attempt was on foot to create a Lieutenant-General to take command in the field over me. Shocked and distressed, I allowed of no relaxation in my efforts to serve my country, and resolved that for the short time I was likely to remain in command to be
True as the dial to the sun,
Although it be not shined upon.
A still greater outrage soon followed. Failing to obtain an act for the citizens' Lieutenant-General, a bill was pressed upon Congress to authorize the placing of a junior Major-General (just appointed the same individual), in command over all the old Major Generals then in front of the enemy. I will not here trust myself to add a soldier's comment upon those attempts, but I may thank God that He did not allow them, or subsequent injuries to break down entirely the spirit and abilities (such as they are) with which He had endowed me.
Foreseeing at Washington, that from the great demands of commerce at the moment, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to take up perhaps at any price a sufficient number of vessels at New Orleans and Mobile to transport the regiments of my expedition from the Rio Grande frontier to Vera Cruz. I endeavored to impress upon the War Department the necessity of sending out from the northern and eastern ports a certain number of large ships in ballast, in order that the expedition might not be delayed, and in view of the fixed fact, the return of the vomito at Vera Cruz, in the spring of the year, a delay of a few weeks was likely to prove a total defeat.
In a paper transmitted to me, headed Memorandum for the Quartermaster-General, marked War Department, December 15, 1846, and signed by the Secretary, which I received January 8, 1847, it is said, independently of this number of transports for troops and ordnance stores (from the north), there will be required, say five ships for the transportation of the (surf) boats now being prepared, besides which ten vessels must be taken up and sent out in ballast (for troops), unless
