Page:Notes of the Mexican war 1846-47-48.djvu/501

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NOTES OF THE MEXICAN WAR.
495

stores can be put on board to make up the number (40) required by the commanding General. The date of this memorandum is December 15th, more than three weeks after my requisition and departure from Washington, and not one of the ten vessels in ballast, or with stores (leaving room for troops), have I heard of up to this day, relying upon them confidently. The embarkation was delayed in whole or in part at the Brazos and Tampico, from the 15th of January to the 9th of March, leaving, it was feared, not half the time needed for the reduction of Vera Cruz and its castles before the return of the yellow fever. But half the surf-boats came at all, and of the siege train and ordnance stores, only about one-half had arrived when the Mexican flags were replaced by those of the United States on those formidable places. We succeeded at last in reaching the point of attack, in the midst of frightful northern, by means in great part of trading craft, small and hazardous, picked up accidently at the Brazos and Tampico; and when the army got ashore, its science and valor had to supply all deficiencies in heavy guns, mortars and ordnance.

The first letter that I received from the department after entering the captured city, contained an elaborate rebuke (dated February 22d), for having ordered Col. Harney, of Second Dragoons, to remain in the command of the cavalry with Maj.-Gen. Taylor, so as to leave Maj. Summer, of the same regiment, the senior of that arm in my expedition. There was no great difference in the number of cavalry companies with the armies.

This rebuke was written with a complacency that argued the highest professional experience in such matters, and could not have been more confident in its tone if dictated to the greenest general of the recent appointments. Yet, without the power of selecting commanders of particular corps, no general-in-chief would venture to take upon himself the conduct of a critical campaign. Such selections were always made by the father of his country, and the principal general