and confers so great a superiority on man, is, as we have shown, based upon his faculty for these representations, this faculty evidently and unquestionably constitutes that Reason, which from time immemorial has been reputed the prerogative of mankind. Likewise all that has been considered by all nations and in all times explicitly as the work or manifestation of the Reason, of the λόγος, λόγιμον, λόγιστικόν, ratio, la ragione, la razon, la raison, reason, may evidently also be reduced to what is only possible for abstract, discursive, reflective, mediate knowledge, conditioned by words, and not for mere intuitive, immediate, sensuous knowledge, which belongs to animals also. Cicero rightly places ratio et oratio together,[1] and describes them as quce docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, judicando, conciliat inter se homines, &c. &c., and[2] rationem dico, et, si placet, pluribusverbis, mentem, consilivm, cogitationem, prudentiam, And[3] ratio, qua una prcestamus beluis, per quam conjectura valemus, argumentamur, refellimus, disserimus, conficimus aliquid, concludimus. But, in all ages and countries, philosophers have invariably expressed themselves in this sense with respect to the Reason, even to Kant himself, who still defines it as the faculty for principles and for inference; although it cannot be denied that he first gave rise to the distorted views which followed. In my principal work,[4] and also in the Fundamental Problems of Ethics, I have spoken at great length about the agreement of all philosophers on this point, as well as about the true nature of Reason, as opposed to the distorted conceptions for which we have to thank the pro-
- ↑ Cicer. "De Offic." i. 16.
- ↑ Idem, "De nat. deor." ii. 7.
- ↑ Idem, "De Leg." i. 10.
- ↑ See "Die Welt a. W. u. V." 2nd edition, vol. i. § 8, and also in the Appendix, pp. 577-585 (3rd edition, pp. 610-620), and again vol. ii. ch. vi.; finally "Die b. G-P. d. Ethik," pp. 148-154 (2nd edition, pp. 146-151).
