Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3b.djvu/129

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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phase of U. S participation.

17. Logistic Requirements: This course of action can be logistically supported with the following effects:

a. No delay to NATO deliveries.
b. No drain on Army logistic reserves, negligible drain on Air Force logistic reserves, a partial drain on certain logistic reserves of the Navy, particularly aircraft and ammunition.
c. Some Navy production schedule increases in aircraft and ammunition (depending on extent of operations), some increases in Air Force production schedule with emphasis on ammunition, no effect on Army production schedules.
d. No additional facilities at bases in Indochina required.

18. The training of indigenous forces is crucial to the success of the operation. The United States should therefore insist on an understanding with the French which will insure the effective training of the necessary indigenous forces required including commanders and staff personnel at all levels The United States must be prepared to make contributions of funds, materials, instructors and training devices as agreed with the French. A United States program for the development of indigenous forces would stress the organization of divisional size units. The battalion organization does not particularly well fit the approved

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