The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend steps which the U. S. might take to assist in achieving success of the Navarre Plan. Among these steps are: a renewed emphasis by France on support of the Navarre Plan; an assignment of additional specialists to MAAG, Indochina; an increase in unconventional warfare activities; a re-examination of current national strategy; and an interim revision of French NATO commitments. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 15 January 1954
212
51.
The President approves the statement of policy in NSC 177, "United states Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia," which views the loss of Indochina as having "most serious repercussions on U.S. and free world interests.…" (NSC 177 was renumbered as NSC 5405) NSC 5405, 16 January 1954
217
52.
Senator Stennis informs Secretary Wilson that the U. S. should stop short of sending troops or airmen to Indochina. "I do not think we can at all afford to take chances on becoming participants in Indochina." Stennis letter to Secretary of Defense, 29 January 1954
239
53.
The President's Special Committee decides to recommend action on certain urgent French requests for twenty-two B-26 aircraft and two hundred Air Force mechanics for Indochina, and to await General O'Daniel's return before deciding on other requests. It is generally agreed that the importance to the U.S. of winning in Indochina could lead to intervention by U.S. air and naval forces -- but "not ground forces." ISA Memorandum for the Record, 30 January 1954
240
54.
The President approves, and the CJCS notifies France of U. S. transfer to Indochina of ten B-26 type aircraft and two-hundred USAF mechanics. This brings to twenty-two the total of B-26 aircraft slated for delivery to Indochina. Admiral Radford (Anderson) Memorandum to General Valluy, 30 January 1954
245
55.
General O'Daniel reports on General Navarre's lack of enthusiasm on having a U. S. "liaison officer" and his disinterest in U. S. participation in psychological warfare. O'Daniel recommends that a small Joint Staff be approved, additional funds to STEM be approved, and the employment of liaison officers be approved. He comments that Dien Bien Phu can withstand any kind of Viet Minh attack, but would be untenable to a force that had several battalions of artillery with air observation. O'Daniel Report to JCS, 5 February 1954
246
56.
Korean President Syngman Rhee proposes sending a ROKA Division to Indochina, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the transfer would not be in the best interests of the Free World. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 1 March 1954
259
57.
The JCS express concern over developments in the status of the MAAG Chief to Indochina relative to a considerable increase in personnel and scope of training responsibilities. The French feel that "it should be clearly understood that neither O'Daniel nor MAAG was to have any powers, advisory or otherwise" in planning operations or training the national armies. The JCS feels a demotion of O'Daniel in deference to Navarre is detrimental to U. S. prestige. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 5 March 1954
264
58.
In the preparation of Defense Department views regarding negotiations on Indochina for the Geneva Conference, the JCS reaffirm there position concerning the strategic importance of Indochina to the security interests of the United States as reflected in NSC 5405. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense 12 March 1954
266
59.
General Erskine submits the President's Special Committee recommendations on the military implications of the U. S. position on Indochina at Geneva. The analysis concludes that "no solution to the Indochina problem short of victory is acceptable." The conclusions expressed are felt to merit consideration by the NSC and the President. Erskine Memorandum for the Special Committee, NSC, 17 March 1954
271
60.
Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, is fully in accord with the JCS views (Document No. 43) and General Erskine's recommendations (Document No. 44), and recommends to Secretary Dulles that they be carefully considered in preparation for the Geneva Conference. Wilson letter to Dulles, 23 March 1954
276
61.
General Ely feels that any air intervention at Dien Bien Phu would have to come from Chinese territory and would carry grave consequences. "Can direct intervention by U. S. aircraft be envisaged and, if such is the case, how would it take place?" See Annex A of Document 63, page 277. General Ely Memorandum to Admiral Radford, 23 March 1954
286
62.
Admiral Radford shares doubts of other JCS members on the adequacy of measures taken by General Navarre at Dien Bien Phu. Geneal Ely predicts the outcome at Dien Bien Phu as "50-50" and emphasizes the greed political importance of the battle. Radford is "gravely fearful" that French measures will be inadequate, the consequences could lead to loss of Southeast Asia, and to avoid this, the U. S. must be "prepared to act promptly and in force" to a belated French request for intervention. See Annex B to Document 63, page 277. JCS Memorandum for the President, 24 March 1954
288
63.
General Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, is "unsympathetic" to the JCS view to expand MAAG, Indochina to assist in training Vietnamese. Ely feels it would encroach on French responsibilities, would affect "prestige" and shows lack of confidence in French leadership. (Annex A, Ely Memorandum for Radford; Annex B, JCS Memorandum for the President) JCS Memorandum for President's Committee, 29 March 1954
277
64.
The U. S. reiterates to the U. K. the following assumed position: (1) that Britain supports our agreement to discuss Indochina at Geneva provided France would not turn over the area to the Communists; and (2) "we shall not, however, be disposed to give Communist China what it wants from us merely to buy its promises of future good behavior." Dulles 5090 to London, 1 April 1954
291
65.
The U. S. proposes a coalition of U. S., France, Associated States, U. K., Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines, which would fight in Indochina as an alternative to French Union surrender and as a position of strength going to Geneva. Dulles 3476 to Paris, 3 April 1954
293
66.
The British consider partition the "least undesirable settlement" for Indochina and had not developed thoughts on a confrontation with a French sell-out. Dulles 5177 to London, 4 April 1954
295
67.
The French request "immediate armed intervention of U. S. carrier aircraft at Dien Bien Phu" to save the situation. Admiral Radford had previously assured Ely that he would "do his best" to obtain the U. S. support. Paris 3710 to Dulles, 4 April 1954
296
68.
NSC Action No. 1074–A considers the problem of determining the circumstances, conditions, and. extent to which the U.S. should commit it its resources to save Indochina. The problem involves four issues: (1) the prospect of loss of Indochina; (2) the risks, requirements, and consequences of intervention; (3) desirability and form of U.S. intervention; and (4) the timing and circumstances of intervention. NSC Action 1074–A, 5 April 1954
298
69.
The U. S . Army position on intervention in Indochina cites the military disadvantages of such action. Specifically, the Army views are that air and naval forces alone cannot assure victory; that atomic weapons do not reduce the number of ground troops required; that at least seven U. S. divisions with air and naval support are required to win iftheFrenchwithdrawandtheChinesedonotintervene; and that the equivalent of twelve U. S. divisions are required if the Chinese intervene. Army Position on NSC Action No. 1074-A (undated)
332
70.
The President's Special Committee studies the problem to secure the defeat of Communism and establish a "Western oriented complex" in Southeast Asia without resort to overt combat operations by U. S. forces. The report recommends implementation of courses of action previously recommended by the JCS (i. e., augment the French Air Force, assign CIA officials to Indochina, and allocate additional funds to Indochina); and that selective political, military, and psychological steps be taken as a matter of priority (i. e., expand MAAG, expand use of U.S. covert assets in unconventional warfare field, develop foreign information campaign, etc.). Part I, "Indochina" to the President's Special Committee Report on Southeast Asia (undated)
333
71.
The President's Special Committee submits recommendations concerning longer range policy and courses of action for possible future contingencies in Southeast Asia not covered by NSC 5405. It is recommended that the U. S. accept nothing short of military victory, oppose a negotiated settlement at Geneva, pressure the Associated States to continue the war with U. S. support even if negotiations succeed, and seek participation of other nations. Regardless of the outcome of current operations in Indochina, the U. S. in all prudence should develop a regional defense posture incorporating all the Southeast Asian states. Part II, Special Committee Report on Southeast Asia, 5 April 1954
346
72.
"U. S. is doing everything possible…to prepare public, Congressional, and constitutional basis for united action in Indochina." However, such action is considered "impossible" except on a coalition basis with British Commonwealth participation. Dulles 3482 to Paris, 5 April 1954
359
73.
France feels that the time for formulating coalitions has passed as the fate of Indochina will be decided in the next ten days at Dien Bien Phu. Dillon (Paris) 3729 to Dulles, 5 April 1954
360
74.
The National Security Council receives recommendations of the Planning Board on NSC Action 1074-A . The Board recommends that the U. S. intervene if necessary but continue to pressure the French and to support a regional defense grouping in Southeast Asia with maximum Asian participation. The NSC also receives an assessment of risks in intervention and alternative policies. NSC 192d Meeting (Item 1), 6 April 1954
361
75.
Eden feels the seriousness of the French military situation is exaggerated -- "French cannot lose the war between now and the coming of the rainy season however badly they may conduct it." London 4382 to Dulles, 6 April 1954
366
76.
Dulles emphasizes that unless a new element is interjected into Indochina situation, such as an ad hoc coalition of nations prepared to fight, the French will "sell-out" at Geneva. The U. K., Australia, and New Zealand attitude is the key to "united action" and it is believed that Red China would not intervene. Dulles 163 to Canberra, 6 April 1954
367
77.
The Maloney mission, which reviewed the Indochina cost study with the U. S. Country Team in Saigon, concludes that "it is not possible…to arrive at any reasonable estimate of cost" to the U. S. of materials for the Indochina war. The "crash requirements" and the French impression (from visiting U. S. officials) that all requests will be granted has kept the MDAP program in a "constant state of flux." Maloney Memorandum to Deputy Defense Comptroller, 7 April 1954
370
78.
Should Communist China intervene in Indochina with combat aircraft, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that talks should. be initiated to provide for implementation of military actions as outlined in NSC 5405. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 8 April 1954
378
79.
It is noted by the NSC Planning Board that France has had the loan of U. S. carrier "Belleau Wood" for nearly a year without use in the Indochina war. Further, the French "urgent requests" for U. S. aircraft appear contradictory in light of the sale of "Ouragon" jets to India and use of the "Belleau Wood" as a "delivery wagon." General Bonesteel Memorandum for Robert Cutler Presidential Assistant, 10 April 1954
380
80.
In view of the NSC actions on 6 April (192d Meeting) and subsequent Presidential approval the Secretary of Defense directs the JCS to "promptly prepare the military plans" for the contingency of intervention at Dien Bien Phu. He also notes that the Presidential directed the State Department to concentrate its efforts prior to Geneva on organizing a regional grouping for the defense of Southeast Asia. Secretary of Defense Memorandum to the Secretaries and JCS, 15 April 1954
382
81.
The Department of Defense indicates concern over the lack of U. S. policy and pressures the State Department to come up with a U. S. position for the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference. The Defense version of a draft position recommends a positive and definite stance that U. S. objectives in Southeast Asia not be compromised and that if France does not accept this position the U. S. should not participate at Geneva. Defense Foreign Military Affairs Letter to U. Alexis Johnson, Coordinator of U. S. Delegation to Geneva, 15 April 1954
384
82.
Eden informs Dulles that Britain is strongly opposed to intervention at Dien Bien Phu and intends to lend only diplomatic support to France at Geneva in search of a settlement. DULTE 5 (Geneva) to Washington, 25 April 1954
388
83.
Dulles expresses "dismay that the British are apparently encouraging the French in a direction of surrender which is in conflict not only with our interest but what I [Dulles] conceive theirs to be." DULTE 9, 26 April 1954
390
84.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff reject a French proposal for additional aid because of the major military consequences of involving U. S. planes and crews in the Indochina action as well as the little value of the project to relief of Dien Bien Phu. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 27 April 1954
392
85.
Dulles and Eden exchange frank and heated words over the British pressuring France for a cease-fire. The U. S. indicates that the tripartite position is poor, i. e., not "very impressive or cohesive" and that "the other side" was worried -- but not about Britain. The U. S. is also concerned over the affects on NATO, EDC and the entire defense structure in Europe. DULTE 13, 27 April 1954
395
86.
Dulles makes an estimate of rapidly moving developments: (1) when Dien Bien Phu falls, the French Government will change, probably to the left, committed to liquidate China. A withdrawal of forces to defensible enclaves under U.S. protection with subsequent U.S. training of native armies is considered. Open intervention at this point would be answered by Chinese intervention, (2) U.K. attitude is one of increasing weakness, (3) "the decline of France, the great weakness of Italy, and. the considerable weakness of England create a situation where we must be prepared to take the leadership.…" DULTE 21, 29 April 1954
397
87.
In the event of a cease-fire in Indochina, the JCS recommend that shipment of U. S. military aid under MDAP be immediately suspended and the entire program of aid to Indochina be re-examined. JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 30 April 1954
399
88.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that the fall of Dien Bien Phu would have far-reaching and adverse repercussions, but would not signal the collapse of the French Union political and military situation in Indochina, nor would it substantially alter relative military capabilities of French and Viet Minh forces. The French Union could retain control of the cities though there would be a serious decline in the Vietnamese will to continue the war. NIE 63–54, 30 April 1954
400
89.
Major General Thomas J. H. Trapnell, former Chief of MAAG, Indochina comments in his debriefing on the French situation in Indochina. His comments cover in detail the strategic position. of Indochina, the government and its prosecution of the war, the performance of MDAP supported forces, the objectives of the opposing forces, the organization and tactics of both the French and Viet Minh forces. In Trapnell's view, few of the aims of the Navarre concept are progressing satisfactorily. Dien Bien Phu is not only another Na San, but a grave
tactical and strategic error." On the political aspects of the war, Trapnell feels that "a strictly military solution to the war in Indochina is not possible…It is doubtful if the ordinary people understand the issues at stake between the rebel and Associated states objectives." The solution in Indochina requires a strong French assault on the Viet Minh, training of National armies, a defensive alliance of Asian nations, and a guarantee of the Associated States borders. Trapnell recommends a U.S. training mission for Indochina, and concludes that victory in Indochina is international rather than local and essentially political as well as military. Major General Trapnell Debriefing, 3 May 1954
406
90.
Indochina is the only nation that has the highest MDAP priority and thus has precedence over every other nation for allocation of critical military equipment. The JCS have completed a plan for military intervention in Indochina and, as well, planned for resumption of hostilities in Korea. CINCPAC has directed that other plans be prepared, i. e., blockade of China Coast, evacuation of French forces from Tokin, etc. Joint Subsidiary Plane Memorandum for OCB, 5 May 1954
421
91.
General Smith reviews the French proposal which has been sent to the Cabinet for approval. France proposes a cease-fire take place when "international" control machinery, based on Laniel's 5 March conditions, is in place. Regular troops would be regrouped into delimited areas and all other forces disarmed. France assumes that the Russians would propose a follow-on political settlement (coalition) and immediate elections. SECTO 106, 5 May 1954
423
92.
The NSC 195th Meeting considers Secretary Dulles pessimistic report on Geneva to the President : (1) there is no responsible French Government to deal with, (2) the British reject the "regional grouping," (3) the British want secret talks on Southeast Asia, (4) the expected communist proposal is for foreign troop withdrawal and elections, (5) and the U.K wants a settlement based on partition. NSC 195th Meeting, 6 May 1954
425
93.
Dulles briefs Congressional leaders on the Geneva Conference and reviews the weaknesses of Britain's position. Congress members comments are adverse. Dulles states three conclusions: (1) U.S. should not intervene militarily, (2) U.S. must push rapidly for a Southeast Asia, community, (3) and the U. S. should not "write off" the British and French in spite of their weakness in Asia. TEDUL 37, 6 May 1954
426
94.
The JCS forward their views on negotiations with respect to Indochina to the Secretary of Defense for transmittal to the Department of State in regard to SECTO 106. The JCS feel that, based on the Korean experience, and as a minimum, the U.S. should not "associate itself with any French proposal directed toward a cease-fire in advance of a satisfactory political settlement." JCS Memorandum to Secretary of Defense, 7 May 1954
430
95.
President Eisenhower makes it clear that the preconditions for U.S. intervention in Indochina are that the "U.S. would never intervene alone, that the indigenous people must invite intervention, and that there must be regional or collective action. The NSC action of the meeting on 5 April as pertains to paragraph 1.b. of the record (organizing a regional grouping) is approved by the President. Memorandum by R. Cutler, Special Assistant, for Secretary of Defense and CJCS and Meeting Minutes, 7 May 1954
435
96.
May 8 - July 21: Geneva Conference on Indochina. The 1st Plenary Session convenes on 8 May and hears proposals by France and the Viet Minh for cessation of hostilities and participation in the conference. (Excerpts) The delegates to the conference are from Great Britain and the USSR (joint chairmen), France, the United States, Communist China, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and the Viet Minh regime. (Final agreements are signed on July 20 and 21, and the main provisions concerning Vietnam are that (1) Vietnam is to be partitioned along the 17th parallel into North and South Vietnam, (2) regulations are imposed on foreign military bases and personnel and on increased armaments, (3) country-wide elections, leading to the reunification of North and South Vietnam, are to be held by July 20, 1956, and (4) an International Control Commission (ICC) is to be established to supervise the implementation of the agreements. The United States and Vietnam are not signatories to these agreements. The United States issues an unilateral declaration stating that it (1) "will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the Geneva agreements, (2) "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security," and (3) "shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections , supervised by the UN to insure that they are conducted fairly.") Excerpts from 1st Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference, 8 May 1954
439
97.
The Defense member of the NSC Planning Board indicates the options available to the U.S. with regard to the Geneva results. General Bonesteel suggests that the increased risks associated with pressuring France to continue the war and possible U.S. intervention to stop the communist advance can "more surely and safely be accepted now than ever again." On the other hand, a compromise at Geneva would lead to communist subversion at a late date and U.S. involvement then might be inhibited by an increased Soviet nuclear capability. "Asia could thus be lost." General Bonesteel Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 9 May 1954
442
98.
The draft instructions for the Geneva Delegation, which have been approved by the President are sent to the Defense Department for comment. According to the instructions, the U.S. is "an interested nation which, however, is neither a belligerent nor a principal in the negotiation." State Department Letter to R. B. Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 10 May 1954
443
99.
France is convinced it is facing Communist China at Dien Bien Phu not Viet Minh rebels. The French request the aid of competent U.S. military advice, i.e., a U.S. General to confer with General Ely on regrouping forces in Indochina. Paris 4287 to Dulles, 10 May 1954
446
100.
The United States "posture" at Geneva is interpreted as "to cheer the players" rather than "to pitch." The draft instructions to the Geneva delegation imply a "profound point" -- will the U.S. admit diplomatic defeat and cease to use the conference toward its ends if the conference appears to go against the U.S.? General Bonesteel Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense, 10, May 1954
449
101.
The President approves informing the French of his conditions for U.S. intervention in Indochina. Even though premature, the decision to internationalize the war must be made. President Eisenhower would ask Congressional authority to commit U.S. forces provided: (1) there was a French request, (2) that other nations would be requested and would accept, (3) that the UN would be notified, (4) that France guarantees independence in the French Union to the Associated States, including the option to withdraw at any time, (5) that France would not withdraw its forces after the intervention, and (6) that an agreed on structure for united action is reached. Dulles 4023 to Paris, 11 May 1954
451
102.
The President approves NSC Action No. 1111 recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which immediately suspends "shipment of military end-items under U.S. MDAP" to Indochina. NSC Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 11 May 1954
456
103.
Secretary Dulles forwards the basic instructions approved by the President for the head of the U.S. Delegation to Geneva. "The United States is not prepared to give its express or implied approval to any cease-fire, armistice, or other settlement.…" which would subvert the local governments, impair territorial integrity, or jeopardize forces of the French Union. Dulles TOSEC 138 to Geneva, 12 May 1954
457
104.
A proposal tabled at the Planning Board meeting on 13 May 1954, suggests that "the U. S. is endeavoring to avoid the loss of Indochina and to resolve the colonialism problem by the creation of a regional grouping." General Bonesteel Memorandum to NSC, 13 May 1954
460
105.
Laniel and Schuman appear well pleased with the U.S. position, especially that U.K. participation is no longer a prerequisite to U.S. intervention. The one serious objection to Eisenhower's conditions, however, is that "France publicly accord to the Associated States the right of withdrawal from the French Union at any time." Unless some way can be found around this, "the French will never ask for outside assistance." Paris 4383 to Dulles, 14 May 1954
462
106.
In referring to the French objection to Eisenhower's conditions for intervention, Dulles indicates the U.S. might be flexible but "there cannot be any equivocation on the completeness of independence if we are to get the Philippines and Thailand to associate themselves." Without them the whole arrangement would collapse and the U.S. is not prepared to intervene "as part of a white Western coalition which is shunned by all Asian states." Dulles 4094 (TEDUL 73) to Paris, 15 May 1954
465
107.
The "right of withdrawal" from the French Union is unacceptable to France because it reflects on French honor and questions the concept of the French Union. It is proposed that existence of a powerful Vietnamese National Army would clarify the independence status to other Asian states and there fore the U.S. should assume "primary responsibility for the training and equipping of a Vietnamese National Army." Dillon 4402 to Dulles, 17 May 1954
469
108.
The present acute crisis prevents successful debate on the European Defense Community (EDC) proposal in the French Parliament. Any attempt to force a vote would lead to postponement or defeat of EDC. If the Laniel government falls because of Indochina, EDC will likely get buried for good. Paris 4440 to Dulles, 19 May 1954
472
109.
Secretary Stevens emphasizes the Army's concern over high-level official views that "air and sea forces alone could solve our problems in Indochina" and that the complex nature of these problems would require a major logistical effort -- "it explodes the myth that air and sea forces could solve the Indochina problems." Secretary of the Army Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 19 May 1954
475
110.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that U.S. military participation in Indochina be limited primarily to naval and air forces. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 May 1954
477
111.
The JCS recommend against a "Korea-type" defense of Southeast Asia as unsound. Accordingly, the U.S. "should adopt the concept of offensive actions against the 'military power of the aggressor,' (in this instance, Communist China) rather than local reaction to the attack. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 May 1954
480
112.
General Smith cannot understand why the JCS downgraded U.S. military representation on the five-power staff conference because the Russians and Chinese must have known "we really intended serious business." DULTE 100, 23 May 1954
483
113.
The U.S. feels, as a minimum, France and Vietnam should sign draft Treaty of Independence, France should indicate "equal and sovereign" status of French Union states, and declare withdrawal of French Expeditionary Forces as soon as possible. Dulles to Paris 4272, 26 May 1954
484
114.
The JCS point out their belief that, from the U.S. point of view with reference to the Far East, "Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and allocation of more than token U.S. armed forces in Indochina would be a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities." JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 26 May 1954
487
115.
The White House views the JCS position on intervention in Indochina as not involving any new policy issue relative to NSC 5405. However, a pencilled Secretary of Defense marginal note indicates that the White House "misses the point" -- the JCS was considering the "regional grouping" and others in the grouping, i.e., U.K. may object to NSC 5405 policy. Hence the JCS is warning "not to get involved in such a grouping" unless all parties accept direct action. White House Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 26 May 1954
494
116.
Ely emphasizes particular points to Trapnell and Dillon: (1) Ely was not in accord with O'Daniel's proposal to reorganize the Vietnamese army on a divisional basis, (2) O'Daniel's operational war plan was unrealistic, (3) the increasing frequency of American criticism of French conduct of the war was not appreciated, (4) Ely was regrouping his forces for defense of the Delta, and (5) one or two U.S. Marine divisions could assure defense of the Delta. Paris 4566 to Dulles 27 May 1954
495
117.
The U.S . Delegation to Geneva clearly sees a forthcoming settlement which the U.S., under NSC, cannot associate itself with. Both the dangers of partition and impossibility of armistice supervision in Indochina are recognized. "There is very little that the Defense Department can do to influence the negotiations, since a political decision has been made that the U.S. will continue to participate" even though partition will ultimately result in loss of Indochina to communism. Geneva Delegate Letter to Admiral Davis, 28 May 1954
498
118.
The French suggest that the U.S. take over responsibility for training the Vietnamese National Army and provide assistance toward improving airfields for jet aircraft use in Indochina. Paris 4580 to Dulles, 28 May 1954
500
119.
Dillon clarifies apparent misunderstanding in Washington on French understanding of U.S. intervention if Red China attacks Indochina. Paris 4607 to Dulles, 30 May 1954
503
120.
Schuman, Ely, and Laniel inform Dillon and Trapnell that France regards the present bilateral negotiations as a "prelude to U.S. intervention should Geneva fail" or should the communists drag negotiations to obtain a military decision in the Delta. The French pursue reassurance of U.S. intervention if Red China launches an all-out air attack. Paris 4612 to Dulles, 31 May 1954
506
121.
There is no misunderstanding between U.S. and France if U.S. policy on a Chinese intervention would be "judged under the circumstances of the moment." Dillon cites three courses of action open to the U.S. in such an event: (1) President will request Congress to act, (2) President would request authority to use forces, or (3) U.S. would act only as part of a collective action . Paris 4625 to Dulles, 1 June 1954
508
122.
NSC Action 5421 incloses summaries of studies prepared by various departments and agencies with respect to "possible U.S. action regarding Indochina." Summaries included here are of studies prepared by Departments of State, Justice, Defense and CIA, Office of Defense Mobilization, Bureau of the Budget, Foreign Operations Administration and Operations Coordinating Board. NSC 5421, 1 June 1954
510
123.
Disagreement exists that the U.S. and France have "now reached accord in principal on the political side" on conditions for U.S. participation in Indochina. The U.S. needs a precise statement of France's commitments to meet the preconditions for intervention. Dulles 4421 to Paris, 4 June 1954
530
124.
Saigon suggests that in order to make a French declaration more palatable, the U.S. announce its intention to withdraw technical and military assistance as soon as practicable. In "neutralist Asian eyes, the U.S. is the principal threat to Eastern Asia.…and not decadent France." A review of terms of reference which limit MAAG to a logistical function is now essential. Saigon 2656 to Dulles, 4 June 1954
531
125.
The U.S. seeks to avoid formal identification with open partition or the creation of two states. While U.S. military authorities take a "gloomy view" of the military situation, France has failed to decide to "internationalize" the war on the conditions laid down in Paris. The French are not treating the U. . proposal seriously but "toying with it just enough to use it as a talking point at Geneva." TEDUL 169, 7 June 1954
533
126.
General Valluy evaluates the Tonkin Delta military situation: (1) If Tonkin is lost, a military line will not be re-established; (2) in this connection, there are no South Vietnamese who could oppose North Vietnamese, (3) Ho Chi Minh's objective is Tonkin and the political capital Hanoi, to be gained either by
negotiation or military force as necessary, (4) if Tonkin is lost, France will not fight in the South, (5) nor would Vietnamese fight against other Vietnamese and sooner or later the whole of Vietnam will become communist. TEDUL 171, 7 June 1954
535
127.
Dulles feels that it is of "overriding importance" to push on with action on Thailand's appeal to the United Nations Security Council, TOSEC 368, 7 June 1954
538
128.
The U. S. will seek firm views of others once the "French authoritively tell us they want to internationalize the Indochina war." Further , when France decides to request U. S. intervention, the U. S. must have the opportunity to make its own decision based on prevailing circumstances. "We cannot grant the French an indefinite option on us without regard to intervening deterioration." TEDUL 175, 8 June 1954
540
129.
Because of Thailand's strong feeling the scope of appeal should not be limited to Thailand. The Thai government has a negative attitude on limiting the scope and they object to Czechoslovakia or other Soviet satellite membership on the Peace Observation Commission (POC). United Nations 810 to Dulles, 8 June 1954
542
130.
Bidault replies to a conversation reported in DULTE 156 (not printed here) in which "agreement in principle" with the U.S. had been reached. No major differences are noted, however, French military believe any JCS war plan would show the necessity of at least one Marine division for the Delta. General Valluy's conversation sat the Pentagon are seen as most crucial. "Thus if we want French military assistance…in Southeast Asia…it is vital…JCS…approve a joint war plan justifying the use of Marines." Paris 4766 to Dulles, 9 June 1954
544
131.
Eden cites three major issues emerging on which "we cannot compromise": (1) separate treatment of Laos and Cambodia problem, (2) status and powers of international supervisory authority and (3) composition of the international supervisory authority. Britain feels negotiations have failed and little can be salvaged in Vietnam. DULTE 164, 9 June 1954
547
132.
The French are upset because Admiral Radford had said there "was no question of utilization of Marines in Indochina." The U.S. position, according to Dulles,
had been clear from the start that "we were not willing to make a commitment ahead of time which the French could use for internal political maneuvering or negotiating at Geneva.…" TEDUL 178, 9 June 1954
550
133.
"General Ely has twice in my presence stated that his keenest desire is for the United States to enter this war." The purpose of General Valluy's statement (war assessment) is either to bring the U.S. and five other powers into the conflict or to prepare an "excuse before history" for an armistice. Saigon 274 to Dulles, 10 June 1954
552
134.
The French military feel that a Tonkin decision will rest on U.S. intentions. The French are reluctant to request "internationalization" which would result in new talks and provoke new "hopes." The U.S., on the other hand, does not want to consider a U.S. training mission separate from the "overall operational plan" on the assumption the conditions are fulfilled for U.S. participation in Indochina. Murphy (Acting SecState) 4508 to Paris, 10 June 1954
553
135.
The French impression is that even after all conditions are met, the chances of U.S. participation are "nil." With this attitude it is only a matter of time until the French cone to terms with the Viet Minh. The result would be disastrous to French public opinion and the "U.S. would be blamed" for having failed in the crisis. Therefore, it is recommended that the French be informed that "the President is no longer prepared to request military intervention" even if France fulfills all conditions. France should strive for an armistice and thus avoid a military disaster. A few months delay in communist takeover in Indochina is not commensurate with "possible collapse of the defense of Western Europe." Paris 48141 to Dulles, 14 June 1954
555
136.
The French want, and "in effect have, an option on our intervention, but they do not want to exercise it and the date of expiry of out option is fast running out." TEDUL 197, 14 June 1954
558
137.
Secretary Dulles emphasizes that events have shown that predictions he has made all along on the lack bf any real French desire for U.S. intervention but "as a card to play at Geneva." The U.S. does not see that France's bitterness is justified considering "prolonged French and U.K. indecision." Dulles 4579 to Paris, 14 June 1954
559
138.
It is in the best interests of the U.S. that final adjournment of the Conference take place unless France wants to keep it alive. Eden's departure on a recess is seen as evidence of no reason to delay "collective talks on SEA defense." TEDUL 196, 14 June 1954
561
139.
The CIA estimates communist reactions to the participation of U.S. air and naval forces at various levels of intensity and on various targets in conjunction with French Union forces in Indochina. Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 10-4-54, 15 June 1954
563
140.
Dulles cites an alternative that "if and when " a French Government which had the confidence of the Assembly should decide to continue the war, as opposed to an unacceptable armistice, the U.S. would be prepared to respond promptly. TEDUL 208, 16 June 1954
570
141.
Viet Minh demand all of Tonkin area including Hanoi and Haiphong in secret talks with France. The U.S. informs France that "we did not wish to be.…abruptly confronted with agreement…" as a result of secret negotiations and suggest a U.S. liaison officer. DULTE 187, 16 June 1954
572
142.
China and the Soviet Union are "greatly concerned" over any break-up of the Indochina conference. Eden expresses the view that China wants a settlement but doubts their degree of control over the Viet Minh. DULTE 193, 17 June 1954
574
143.
The "underground military talks" at Geneva are pointing toward a defacto partition of Indochina. "There can of course be no repeat no question of U.S. participation in any attempt to 'sell' a partition to non-communist Vietnamese. TEDUL 212, 17 June 1954
576
144.
U.S. re-examines possible defacto partition of Vietnam in light of five-power staff report suggesting Thakhek-Donghoi line. TEDUL 222, 18 June 1954
577
145.
The French feel that partition is the best settlement they could have worked for under the conditions laid down by U.S. for intervention which "no French Parliament would approve." Partition should come as no surprise to the Vietnamnese since the Viet Minh had wade it clear to them -- "coalition government or partition." DULTE 195 , 18 June 1954
578
146.
General Smith and Molotov conduct lengthy conversations on "making positions clear." The Soviet tactics were probably to forestall U.S. intervention in the Delta by a compromise formula if intervention appeared imminent. When intervention became improbable, the "ante" in negotiations was raised. DULTE 202, 19 June 1954
580
147.
In conversations with the French, China recognizes that "two governments" exist in Vietnam and Chou En-lai regards that the final political settlement should be reached by direct negotiations between the two governments. Paris 5035 to Dulles, 24 June 1954
589
148.
Dulles thinks our present role at Geneva should "soon be restricted to that of observer.…" TOSEC 478, 24 June 1954
592
149.
A French aide-memoire indicates the French objective to seek a defacto division which leaves a solid territory for the State of Vietnam and further requests that the U.S. do nothing to encourage an anticipated "violent and unreasoning" reaction on the part of Vietnamese patriots who object to an indefinite period of division of the country. Dulles 4852 to Paris , 28 June 1954
593
150.
French negotiations with Viet Minh are stalled and Mendes-France is perplexed by reference to the "Dong Hoi" line since France was holding out for the 18th parallel. Paris 5117 to Dulles, 30 June 1954
596
151.
Dulles warns that Ngo Dinh Diem has been "kept in the dark" on French negotiations and fears that if revealed as a faitaccompli the reaction French wish to avoid will result. Dulles 39 to Paris, 2 July 1954
597
152.
France apologizes for not keeping the U.S. fully informed of French military withdrawals in the Delta. In addition, while France is holding out for an eighteen-month period before elections, Diem, to the contrary, has suggested elections within a year. Paris 32 to Dulles, 2 July 1954
598
153.
The French speak most firmly to the Viet Minh that the proposal for demarcation along the thirteenth parallel is unacceptable. On Soviet interest in the line, the French threaten that the line they propose is acceptable to the rest of the conference and thus averts the "risk of internationalization of the conflict ." SECTO 557, 3 July 1954
600
154.
The U S. does not want to be associated with a settlement which falls short of the seven-point memorandum on which Britain agreed and now appear to be less than firm. "If either or both the French and Communists are operating on the assumption we will adhere to any settlement they agree to, then we may be headed for serious trouble." Dulles 52 to Paris, 3, July 1954
603
155.
Dillon recommends that if the U.S. attempts to get the best possible settlement, we should (1) maintain a Geneva delegation, (2) have Dulles return to head the delegation, (3) offer French support to sell a settlement to Vietnam if it is satisfactory, and (4) pressure Britain to stick to the seven points of US-UK agreement. Paris 41 to Dulles, 4 July 1954
606
156.
The French welcome the US-UK 7-point agreement except that clarification was suggested on the conflict between provisions for elections and the position that no political provisions should risk loss of the area to communism . The French felt that the elections could "go wrong." Paris 50 to Dulles, 6 July 1954
608
157.
The French indicate they attach no great military importance to retention of Haiphong and that they were "avoiding contact" with the Vietnamese in order not to have to answer their questions. SECTO 560, 6 July 1954
609
158.
Mendes-France will announce to the National Assembly that if a cease-fire is not agreed to prior to 21 July, it will be necessary for the Assembly to approve the sending of conscripts to Indochina. Paris 66 to Dulles, 6 July 1954
612
159.
Dulles informs Eden that it is "better if neither Bedell nor I went back" to Geneva since the French will probably settle for worse than the 7-point agreement, hence it would be embarrrassing to all concerned. Dulles NIACT 101 to London, 7 July 1954
614
160.
The U.S. feels that elections mean eventual unification of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh and therefore should be held "as long after a cease-fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation.…" Further, the U.S. believes no date should be set now and that no conditions be accepted which would affect international supervision of elections. The U.S. would not oppose a settlement based on the 7-points nor would we seek to upset a settlement by force. Dulles 77 to Paris, 7 July 1954
616
161.
Dillon discovers that the U.S. complaints of not being informed are proved unjustified on the French withdrawal in Tonkin. Both State and Defense were notified via Trapnell's hand-carried plans and diplomatic cables. Public statements thus "can only serve to make our position here vis-a-vis Mendes and his government increasingly difficult and undermine the confidence of both the French Government and people in our candor…" Paris 81 to Dulles, 7 July 1954
618
162.
"I have never harbored any thought of wilful concealment…there is a certain lack of intimacy…" in relations with the present government. The U.S. intends to leave representation at Geneva but not Bedell Smith nor Dulles will return. The U.S. should avoid a "position at Geneva…" Dulles 85 to Paris, 8 July 1954
619
163.
The Chinese inform Ambassador Johnson that Chou En-lai had a ""very good meeting" with Ho Chi Minh and that "results would be helpful to the French." The French believe that the Sino-Soviet positions have been coordinated with the Chinese views on Asian problems being given major weight. SECTO 578, 9 July 1954
622
164.
The Defense Department queries the State Department regarding equipping three French light infantry divisions for Indochina in view of (1) the Premier's promise to end the war by 20 July and (2) the considerable impact of equipment removal on NATO. Defense Letter to State, 9 July 1954
624
165.
President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles indicate firmly to President Mendes-France the rationale behind not sending Dulles or General Smith back to Geneva. Essentially, the rationale is based on failure of the U.S., U.K. and France to agree on a joint position at Geneva and lack of agreement on a "united action" proposal if the position is not accepted by the communists. Dulles sees France and U.K. enhancing a communist "whittling-away" process by readily accepting less than the seven points. Dulles 127 to Paris, 10 July 1954
625
166.
France views the Dulles decision as (1) making the French bargaining position weaker and (2) that Europe would interpret U.S. absence from Geneva as a step in the "return to a policy of isolationism." Paris 134 to Dulles, 11 July 1954
631
167.
France indicates the "necessity for a clear-cut U.S. guarantee that would protect the Associated States" if the communists did not honor a Geneva settlement. Mendes-France will resign if no cease-fire is reached. Paris 133 to Dulles, 11 July 1954
633
168.
Views of the U.K. on collective security of Southeast Asia are summarized: (1) the British prefer a generalized collective arrangement with as many states involved as possible; (2) the preferred organization would have a general council, a political/economic council, and a military organization; (3) in the event of no Indochina agreement, the British would move ahead with a military arrangement to meet the threat. Admiral Davis Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 13 July 1954
635
169.
Secretary Dulles reports on the Paris meeting: (1) an agreed French-United states position paper on Indochina which has the United States respecting terms conforming to a 7-point agreement; (2) the 7 points along the lines which were agreed during the Churchill-Eisenhower conversations; (3) a Mendes-France to Dulles letter which tells Dulles that his absence from Geneva would produce an effect opposite to his intention; (4) a Dulles to Mendes-France letter which informs him of General Smith's return to Geneva; (5) and a letter from Eden to Mendes-France reassuring him of Britain's support. Paris 179 to Dulles, 14 July 1954
638
170.
Secretary Dulles reports on his trip to Paris at the NSC meeting. Dulles had told Mendes that France's troubles stemmed from lack of a decision on EDC and the Soviets were successful in splitting France and Germany. If the U.S. cannot guarantee the Geneva Conference results or influence France to reject any settlement, the U.S. will be blamed and put a major strain on Franco-United States relations. NSC Minutes, 15 July 1954
644
171.
Mendes-France is firm in a cocktail conversation with Molotov on Vietnam election dates. The French, however, conceive the military demarcation line and regroupment of forces to be the major outstanding issues. SECTO 626, 16 July 1954
646
172.
At a meeting of Mendes, Eden, and Molotov, the outstanding issues are summarized: (1) demarcation line for Vietnam; (2) elections; (3) control arrangements; (4)
regroupment time; (5) prevention of arms importation, and (6) Laotian regroupment areas. France strongly opposes Molotov on holding elections in 1955 and placing the demarcation line at the 16th parallel. SECTO 632, 17 July 1954
648
173.
The Vietnamese delegation to the Geneva Conference secretly passes the U. S. delegate a note of protest which had been handed to the French. The note complains that the "National Government of Vietnam has been left in complete ignorance" of proposals made by the French to other nations on Vietnam's fate. Vietnam rejects the defacto partition proposal, a cease-fire, and requests that United Nations control be established over all Vietnam territory. SECTO 633, 17 July 1954
651
174.
The Chinese Communists inform the U.S. of their position via Seymour Topping, Associated Press. The despatch reflects the views of Chou En-lai and demands that the U, S. guarantee a "partition peace plan." Further, China is hopeful of a cease-fire but did not rule out the chance for one even if the U.S. refuses to accept the armistice. SECTO 639, 18 July 1954
653
175.
The U.S. fears Britain will push France into an agreement short of the 7 points resulting in a situation which had been previously discussed in Paris. TOSEC 565, 18 July 1954
656
176.
At the 23rd Indochina restricted session, Tran Van Do (Vietnam) states that Vietnam cannot associate itself with the final declaration of the Conference which is to be reviewed. Vietnam does not agree to conditions for cease-fire nor have they as yet advanced proposals for a solution "based on peace, independence, and unity." SECTO 654, 18 July 1954
658
177.
The Vietnamese delegation requests a plenary session to put forward their position (Document 171, preceding). The U. S. replies that the Vietnamese position is "not practicable" and, in indicating that time is short, suggests that the Vietnamese "speak directly with the French." SECTO 655, 18 July 1954
662
178.
Seymour Topping again supplies confidential information from a Chinese Communist contact, Huang Hua."When Huang Hua spoke of the possibility of American bases in Indochina, or anti-Communist pact in Southeast Asia; he became vary agitated, his hands shook, and his usually excellent English broke down…" Chinese are convinced that France and the U.S. have made a deal.SECTO 661, 19 July 1954
663
179.
International control commission is to be composed of Poland, India, Canada, or Belgium. The U. S. is satisfied that this is better than Korea and is "within the spirit of Point 7." SECTO 666, 19 July 1954
664
180.
General Smith makes it clear to France that the U. S. could, under no circumstance, associate itself with the conference declaration and recommends authorization to amend the proposed U. S. declaration of position. SECTO 669, 19 July 1954
665
181.
Dulles has no objection on Smith's proposal to amend the declaration, but is concerned about including part of paragraph 9 of the Conference declaration, which seems to imply a "multilateral engagement with the Communists" which is inconsistent with the U.S. basic approach. TOSEC 576 NIACT, 19 July 1954
667
182.
The Vietnamese delegation proposes: (1) a cease-fire on present positions; (2) regroupment into two small zones; (3) disarmament of irregular troops; (4) disarmament and withdrawal of foreign troops; and (5) control by the United Nations. It is noted that there is no provision for demarcation line or partition. SECTO 673, 19 July 1954
669
183.
The United States, not prepared to sign the Accords, makes a unilateral declaration of its position on the Conference conclusions. The United states declares that it will refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the agreements and would view any renewal of the aggression with grace concern and as a threat to international peace and security. Unilateral Declaration of the United States, 21 July 1951
671
184.
Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, 21 July 1954
