NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET
-2- 41, July 4, 3 p.m., from Paris
We have one strong card which so far we have apparently not cared to use. That is we can trade willingness to give full diplomatic support to French in their effort to sell settlement to Vietnam in return for a settlement that we can support. The indication which French now have that no matter what the settlement may be, we cannot be counted upon for support with Vietnam obviously greatly weakens our influence with French.
In conclusion if we base our actions solely on the attempt to get the best possible settlement I feel that we should (1) maintain our delegation at Geneva, (2) have you or the Under Secretary return to head the delegation when the other Foreign Ministers return, (3) tell the French at once that we will support them in selling settlement to Vietnam provided that settlement is satisfactory to us, (4) maintain close contact with and pressure on Eden so he sticks to 7 points US-UK agreement.
I fully realize that domestic political considerations must also be taken into account, but I am not in a position to valuate them so I have confined these thoughts to a description of the best method available to US to influence the final settlement at Geneva in the direction we desire.
WLB/5
TOP SECRET
