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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 62. | Admiral Radford shares doubts of other JCS members on the adequacy of measures taken by General Navarre at Dien Bien Phu. Geneal Ely predicts the outcome at Dien Bien Phu as "50-50" and emphasizes the greed political importance of the battle. Radford is "gravely fearful" that French measures will be inadequate, the consequences could lead to loss of Southeast Asia, and to avoid this, the U. S. must be "prepared to act promptly and in force" to a belated French request for intervention. See Annex B to Document 63, page 277. JCS Memorandum for the President, 24 March 1954 | 288 |
| 63. | General Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, is "unsympathetic" to the JCS view to expand MAAG, Indochina to assist in training Vietnamese. Ely feels it would encroach on French responsibilities, would affect "prestige" and shows lack of confidence in French leadership. (Annex A, Ely Memorandum for Radford; Annex B, JCS Memorandum for the President) JCS Memorandum for President's Committee, 29 March 1954 | 277 |
| 64. | The U. S. reiterates to the U. K. the following assumed position: (1) that Britain supports our agreement to discuss Indochina at Geneva provided France would not turn over the area to the Communists; and (2) "we shall not, however, be disposed to give Communist China what it wants from us merely to buy its promises of future good behavior." Dulles 5090 to London, 1 April 1954 | 291 |
| 65. | The U. S. proposes a coalition of U. S., France, Associated States, U. K., Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines, which would fight in Indochina as an alternative to French Union surrender and as a position of strength going to Geneva. Dulles 3476 to Paris, 3 April 1954 | 293 |
| 66. | The British consider partition the "least undesirable settlement" for Indochina and had not developed thoughts on a confrontation with a French sell-out. Dulles 5177 to London, 4 April 1954 | 295 |
| 67. | The French request "immediate armed intervention of U. S. carrier aircraft at Dien Bien Phu" to save the situation. Admiral Radford had previously assured Ely that he would "do his best" to obtain the U. S. support. Paris 3710 to Dulles, 4 April 1954 | 296 |
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