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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 121. | There is no misunderstanding between U.S. and France if U.S. policy on a Chinese intervention would be "judged under the circumstances of the moment." Dillon cites three courses of action open to the U.S. in such an event: (1) President will request Congress to act, (2) President would request authority to use forces, or (3) U.S. would act only as part of a collective action . Paris 4625 to Dulles, 1 June 1954 | 508 |
| 122. | NSC Action 5421 incloses summaries of studies prepared by various departments and agencies with respect to "possible U.S. action regarding Indochina." Summaries included here are of studies prepared by Departments of State, Justice, Defense and CIA, Office of Defense Mobilization, Bureau of the Budget, Foreign Operations Administration and Operations Coordinating Board. NSC 5421, 1 June 1954 | 510 |
| 123. | Disagreement exists that the U.S. and France have "now reached accord in principal on the political side" on conditions for U.S. participation in Indochina. The U.S. needs a precise statement of France's commitments to meet the preconditions for intervention. Dulles 4421 to Paris, 4 June 1954 | 530 |
| 124. | Saigon suggests that in order to make a French declaration more palatable, the U.S. announce its intention to withdraw technical and military assistance as soon as practicable. In "neutralist Asian eyes, the U.S. is the principal threat to Eastern Asia.…and not decadent France." A review of terms of reference which limit MAAG to a logistical function is now essential. Saigon 2656 to Dulles, 4 June 1954 | 531 |
| 125. | The U.S. seeks to avoid formal identification with open partition or the creation of two states. While U.S. military authorities take a "gloomy view" of the military situation, France has failed to decide to "internationalize" the war on the conditions laid down in Paris. The French are not treating the U. . proposal seriously but "toying with it just enough to use it as a talking point at Geneva." TEDUL 169, 7 June 1954 | 533 |
| 126. | General Valluy evaluates the Tonkin Delta military situation: (1) If Tonkin is lost, a military line will not be re-established; (2) in this connection, there are no South Vietnamese who could oppose North Vietnamese, (3) Ho Chi Minh's objective is Tonkin and the political capital Hanoi, to be gained either by | |
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