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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| negotiation or military force as necessary, (4) if Tonkin is lost, France will not fight in the South, (5) nor would Vietnamese fight against other Vietnamese and sooner or later the whole of Vietnam will become communist. TEDUL 171, 7 June 1954 | 535 | |
| 127. | Dulles feels that it is of "overriding importance" to push on with action on Thailand's appeal to the United Nations Security Council, TOSEC 368, 7 June 1954 | 538 |
| 128. | The U. S. will seek firm views of others once the "French authoritively tell us they want to internationalize the Indochina war." Further , when France decides to request U. S. intervention, the U. S. must have the opportunity to make its own decision based on prevailing circumstances. "We cannot grant the French an indefinite option on us without regard to intervening deterioration." TEDUL 175, 8 June 1954 | 540 |
| 129. | Because of Thailand's strong feeling the scope of appeal should not be limited to Thailand. The Thai government has a negative attitude on limiting the scope and they object to Czechoslovakia or other Soviet satellite membership on the Peace Observation Commission (POC). United Nations 810 to Dulles, 8 June 1954 | 542 |
| 130. | Bidault replies to a conversation reported in DULTE 156 (not printed here) in which "agreement in principle" with the U.S. had been reached. No major differences are noted, however, French military believe any JCS war plan would show the necessity of at least one Marine division for the Delta. General Valluy's conversation sat the Pentagon are seen as most crucial. "Thus if we want French military assistance…in Southeast Asia…it is vital…JCS…approve a joint war plan justifying the use of Marines." Paris 4766 to Dulles, 9 June 1954 | 544 |
| 131. | Eden cites three major issues emerging on which "we cannot compromise": (1) separate treatment of Laos and Cambodia problem, (2) status and powers of international supervisory authority and (3) composition of the international supervisory authority. Britain feels negotiations have failed and little can be salvaged in Vietnam. DULTE 164, 9 June 1954 | 547 |
| 132. | The French are upset because Admiral Radford had said there "was no question of utilization of Marines in Indochina." The U.S. position, according to Dulles, | |
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