NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
settlement and should pursue directly with the governments of the Associated States and with other Allies (notably the U. K.), ways and means of continuing the struggle against the Viet Minh in Indochina without participation of the French.
C. The Special Committee has reviewed the findings and and recommendations of the Department of Defense and considers that the implications of this position are such as to warrant their review at the highest levels and by the National Security Council, after which they should become the basis of the U. S. position with respect to Indochina at Geneva, The Special Committee recognizes moreover that certain supplementary and alternative courses of action designed to ensure a favorable resolution of the situation in Indochina merit consideration by the NSC. These, and the Special Committee recommendations with respect thereto, are:
1. The political steps to be taken to ensure an agreed U. S.-U. K.-French position concerning Indochina at Geneva. That the NSC review the proposed political action designed to achieve this objective with particular attention to possible pressure against the French position in North Africa and in NATO, and to the fact that discussions concerning implementation of course 2 and 3 hereunder will be contingent upon the success or failure of this course of action.
2. Overt U. S. involvement in Indochina. That the NSC determine the extent of U. S. willingness, over and above the contingencies listed in NSC 5405, to commit U. S. air, naval and ultimately ground forces to the direct resolution of the war in Indochina with or without French support and in the event of failure in course 1 above. That in this connection the NSC take cognizance of present domestic and international climate of opinion with respect to U. S. involvement and consider the initiation of such steps as may be necessary to ensure world-wide recognition of the significance of such steps in Indochina as a part of the struggle against communist aggression.
3. The development of a substitute base of operations. That the NSC consider whether this course of action is acceptable as a substitute for 1 and 2 above and recognizing that the hope of implementation thereof would be one of major expenditure and long-term potential only.
