NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
1. Maintenance of status quo in Indochina. It is highly improbable that a Communist agreement could be obtained to any negotiated settlement which would be consistent with basic U. S. objectives in Southeast Asia in the absence of a very substantial improvement in the French Union military situation. This could best be accomplished by the aggressive prosecution of military operations.
2. Imposition of a cease-fire. The acceptance of a cease-fire in advance of a s satisfactory settlement would in all probability lead to a political stalemate attended by a concurrent and irretrievable deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position.
3.Establishment of a coalition government. The acceptance of a settlement based upon this course of action would open the way for the ultimate seizure of control by the Communists under conditions which would almost certainly preclude timely and effective external assistance designed to prevent such seizure.
4. Partition of the country. The acceptance of this course of action would represent at the least a partial victory for the Viet Minh and would constitute a retrogressive step in the attainment of U. S. policy and would compromise the achievement of that policy in Southeast Asia.
5. Self-determination through free elections. Many factors render the holding of a truly representative plebiscite infeasible and such a course of action would, in any case, lead to the loss of the Associated States to Communist control.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. That the U. S. and U. K. and France reach an agreement with respect to Indochina which rejects all of the courses enumerated above (except No. 1 on the assumption that the status quo can be altered to result in a military victory) prior to the initiation of discussions on Indochina at Geneva. Failing this, the U. S. should actively oppose each of these solutions, should not entertain discussion of Indochina at Geneva, or having entertained it, should ensure that no agreements are reached.
B. If, despite all U. S. efforts to the contrary the French Government elects to accept a negotiated settlement which fails to provide reasonably adequate assurance of the future political and territorial integrity of Indochina, the U. S. should decline to associate itself with such a
