Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3b.djvu/88

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET


March 17, 1954


MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, NSC

SUBJECT: Military Implications of the U. S. Position on Indochina in Geneva


1. The attached analysis and recommendations concerning the U. S. position in Geneva have been developed by a Sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Department of Defense, JCS, States and CIA.

2. This paper reflects the conclusions of the Department of Defense and the JCS and has been collaborated with the State Department representatives who have reserved their position thereon.

3. In brief, this paper concludes that from the point of view of the U. S. strategic position in Asia, and indeed through out the world, no solution to the Indochina problem short of victory is acceptable. It recommends that this be the basis for the U. S. negotiating position prior to and at the Geneva Conference.

4. It also notes that, aside from the improvement of the present military situation in Indochina, none of the courses of action considered provide a satisfactory solution to the Indochina war.

5. The paper notes that the implications of this position are such as to merit consideration by the NSC and the President.

6. I recommend that the Special Committee note and approve this report and forward it with the official Department of State views to the NSC.


/s/ G.B. ERSKINE

G.B. Erskine
General, USMC (Ret)
Chairman, Sub-committee
President's Special Committee
271
TOP SECRET