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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
INCOMING TELEGRAM
Department of State
ACTION COPY

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Control: 12804
Rec'd: May 27, 1954
8:15 p.m.
FROM: Paris
TO: Secretary or State
no: 4566, May 27, 6 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 4566, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 305, SATGON 550.

EYES ONLY SECRETARY; GENEVA EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY; SAIGON EYES ONLY CHARGE

PASS DEFENSE FOR DEPARTMENT ARMY FOR RIDGEWAY

THIS IS JOINT EMBASSY-TRAPNELL, MESSAGE

After arriving Paris, Trapnell called first on Ambassador for general background discussion and subsequently on General Gruenther for same purpose. He was originally scheduled to call on Laniel May 28 before seeing Ely but because of Prime Minister's preoccupation with Cabinet meetings and other urgent business meeting was postponed. Trapnell accompanied by Ambassador seeing Laniel at latter's home tomorrow morning. Meanwhile Laniel suggested that Trapnell make direct contact with Ely. This was done this morning when Trapnell, accompanied by Embassy Officer, had hour and half interview with Ely, accompanied by Colonel Brohan.

As conversation opened, it became apparent that Ely was not fully aware of reason behind Trapnell's presence in Paris. After this was explained Ely launched into a general review of the Indochina situation giving particular emphasis to following points:

1. He recounted content of talks he had had in Indochine with O'Daniel. He was agreeable to principle of American instruction Vietnamese forces but not entirely in accord with O'Deniel's proposal that national army be reorganized on divisional basis. He believed that divisional units were perhaps too weighty and that lighter units of perhaps 6, 7 or 8 battalions per division were more practicable. Yet, he did not wish to press this point as he regarded it as a detail which could be worked out subsequently. He pointed out that if O'Daniel's concept was followed and US instructor-advisers remained with units upon completion of training, they would have to accompany units into battle and, therefore, major question of whether US prepared to participate in combat operations would arise. Only alternate to this would be replacement of US instructor-advisers by French as units were

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