NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET
| Control: | 4526 |
| Rec'd: | June 9, 1954 |
| 7:45 p.m. |
| FROM: | Geneva |
| TO: | Secretary of State |
| NO: | DULTE 164, June 9, 10 p.m. |
NIACT
EYES ONLY SECRETARY
I had a long talk with Eden this morning. He said that we are clearly coming to end here on Indochina. Three major issues have emerged on which we cannot compromise and on which Communist show no intention of receding. These are (1) separate treatment of Laos and Cambodia, which are clearly victims of Viet Minh aggression; (2) status and powers of impartial international supervisory authority; and (3) composition of international supervisory authority.
He is convinced that we can get no further on these issues and should break within next few days. While he feels no useful negotiating purpose would be served, he is inclined to think that for public opinion it would be desirable that he privately see Molotov once before a break in order to make clear to Molotov firmness our position and obtain Communist position. He is hopeful of forcing Molotov into public rejection Colombo powers for supervisory organization. This will have very beneficial effects in south and southeast Asia. I pointed out, and he agreed, the French situation is such that we would probably have to leave the French and Viet Minh military officers here talking about zones in Vietnam.
Immediately following break he feels Cambodia and Laos should put their cases to the UN entirely divorced from Thailand request. (I gathered that he was thinking of something more than just a POC.) He thinks it highly important that they move rapidly after the conference is wound up, but equally important until that time there be no hints or press leaks whatever that such action is contemplated. He feels that if properly handled and appeals are spontaneous on their part, with no implication of US-UK initiative or prodding, they will receive general Asian support. I pointed out, and he agreed, that France might oppose but we should go ahead anyway. In meanwhile he feels very strongly we must not now complicate matters by insisting on broadening Thailand appeal to Laos and Cambodia. he rightly points out that language in Security Council draft resolution is largely academics, as it will in any event be vetoed. Resolution can be written any way that appears desirable at the time matter comes
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