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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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V.B.3. (Book II)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
| 1954 | Page | |
| 50. | The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend steps which the U. S. might take to assist in achieving success of the Navarre Plan. Among these steps are: a renewed emphasis by France on support of the Navarre Plan; an assignment of additional specialists to MAAG, Indochina; an increase in unconventional warfare activities; a re-examination of current national strategy; and an interim revision of French NATO commitments. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 15 January 1954 | 212 |
| 51. | The President approves the statement of policy in NSC 177, "United states Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia," which views the loss of Indochina as having "most serious repercussions on U.S. and free world interests.…" (NSC 177 was renumbered as NSC 5405) NSC 5405, 16 January 1954 | 217 |
| 52. | Senator Stennis informs Secretary Wilson that the U. S. should stop short of sending troops or airmen to Indochina. "I do not think we can at all afford to take chances on becoming participants in Indochina." Stennis letter to Secretary of Defense, 29 January 1954 | 239 |
| 53. | The President's Special Committee decides to recommend action on certain urgent French requests for twenty-two B-26 aircraft and two hundred Air Force mechanics for Indochina, and to await General O'Daniel's return before deciding on other requests. It is generally agreed that the importance to the U.S. of winning in Indochina could lead to intervention by U.S. air and naval forces -- but "not ground forces." ISA Memorandum for the Record, 30 January 1954 | 240 |
| 54. | The President approves, and the CJCS notifies France of U. S. transfer to Indochina of ten B-26 type aircraft and two-hundred USAF mechanics. This brings to twenty-two the total of B-26 aircraft slated for delivery to Indochina. Admiral Radford (Anderson) Memorandum to General Valluy, 30 January 1954 | 245 |
| 55. | General O'Daniel reports on General Navarre's lack of enthusiasm on having a U. S. "liaison officer" and his disinterest in U. S. participation in psychological warfare. O'Daniel recommends that a small Joint Staff be approved, additional funds to STEM be approved, and the employment of liaison officers be approved. He comments that Dien Bien Phu can withstand any kind of Viet Minh attack, but would be untenable to a force that had several battalions of artillery with air observation. O'Daniel Report to JCS, 5 February 1954 | 246 |
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