NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET
Control: | 3907 |
Rec'd: | May 10, 1954 |
10:52 a.m. |
FROM: | Paris |
TO: | Secretary of State |
NO: | 4287, May 10, 1 p.m. |
NIACT
SENT DEPARTMENT 4287; REPEATED INFORMATION SAIGON 509, NIACT GENEVA 204.
DEPARTMENT AND GENEVA LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
SAIGON EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR
Laniel asked me to come to see him at 10 Sunday night. I found him in a strong and courageous mood reminiscent of the conversations I had last summer at the beginning of the negotiations over the Navarre plan and quite in contrast with his mood of the past few weeks. He stated that he plans to take a very firm position in the National Assembly on Tuesday when Indochina problem comes up again. He plans to say that there are decisions of vital military importance to be taken daily at Geneva. If the National Assembly has someone else in mind whom they can put into office promptly to handle these decisions in a better fashion than he can, they should do so, but that if they are not (repeat not) prepared for the immediate reconstitution of a new government (which they are not) they should stop talking about Indochina and let the government get on with its difficult task.
Laniel then expressed considerable concern regarding (1) the prospects at Geneva; and (2) and more important, the military situation in Indochina. He felt that Indochina phase of Geneva conference had got off to a bad start and considered it very likely that in view of the division and weakness among the Western powers, the Communists will not (repeat not) accept the French proposal for a cease-fire with guarantees, but will press for what in effect would be total surrender.
He said it had been made clear to the French delegation by the Communists that they could not (repeat not) have any conversations direct with the Viet Minh at Geneva but must in all cases proceed through the Chinese. This, plus the fact of large scale Chinese intervention at Dien-Bien-Phu, made it clear that the enemy France