NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
SECRET
firm were included in the study. There are indications that further changes are being considered by the French and/or Vietnamese which have not yet bean officially communicated to the MAAG. For the most part changes as of this date will increase the cost estimates over those included in the original study although they are relatively minor when compared to the overall force levels.
The logistical implications of those frequent changes are important. For example, since mid-January 1954 the Country Team has become aware of three different plans for the build-up of Standard Infantry Battalions and Light (Khin Quan) Battalions in the Vietnamese Army. These plans are summarized as follows:
| Infantry Battalion (Standard) (T/O Personnel: 829) | Light Battalion (K.Q.) (T/O Personnel: 640) | |||||||
| Time Periods | Plan A | Plan B | Plan C | Plan A | Plan B | Plan C | ||
| In being Dec'53 | 86 | 86 | 86 | 54 | 54 | 54 | ||
| Planned Dec'54 | 86 | 97 | 87 | 84 | 100 | 129 | ||
| Planned Dec'54 | 86 | 97 | NA | 120 | 120 | NA | ||
Plan A: Officially submitted to MAAG on 25 January 1954 as basis for logistical planning. MAAG has submitted to JCS for approval. Probably in costäng study base.
Plan B: Unofficially submitted to MAAG in support of request for change in equipment programming on 2 March 1954. MAAG has requested official submission; request as yet unanswered.
Plan C: Learned of through informal sources on 2 April 1954.
The equipment required by a light battalion is significant different from that required by a standard infantry battalion. Shifts in planning of this magnitude over such short periods ox time could easily result in US furnishing equipment of the wrong type for the missions of forces that will actually be activated.
Attached is table F which illustrates the utilization of assigned aircraft. As you will note in the table of the total F-8-F aircraft assigned, only 65% are operational or projected to be operational at any one tine. Likewise, for the B-26, only 55% of the total assigned aircraft are operational or projected to be operational at any one time.
RECOMMENDATION: While it is recognized that a fluid situation requires changes in planning, the necessity of keeping MAAG fully and promptly informed of changes in thinking should be stressed to the French. Further, force plans and T/O's should be stabilized to the maximum extent permitted by the military situation as soon as possible in order to permit orderly and effective logistical support.
REQUIREMENTS: The MAAG hes available for the most part, tables of organization and equipment for major Army tactical units but they are not available for most sector or static units. Where T/O&Es are
