NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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available initial requirements have been computed by the cost study team. The Air Force and the Nary have T/O&Es for a limited number of units, but the MAAG does not accept them as firm enough to be a basis for requirements computations. The T/O&Es available represent a small segment of the total materiel requirements. Therefore, the Army, Nay, and Air Force have been accepting requirements as stated by the French except in those cases where sufficient information is available to modify the requests.
Table (1) attached is a comparison of requirements and assets indicating the incomplete nature of the requirements data available to the MAAG. For some items such as rifles, heavy machine gun, 57mm recoilless rifle, 60mm mortar, all trucks, armored cars M-8, personnel carriers half track, and most signal equipment, the requirements are less than assets, as much as 50% in some cases. No data is available as to the basis for the requirements for the difference between the T/O&Es and the stated assets. Similarly, it is impossible to determine whether there are additional requirements for those end items where requirements exceed assets. Would all the requirements be met if the apparent deficiency were funded? The MAAG is in no position to answer that question or to provide an answer as to the definitive requirements which must still be met.
RECOMMENDATIONS: United States military experienced logistic and planning officers be assigned to General Navarre's staff in an advisory capacity in order to determine logistic requirements for projected programmed operations. If it is not possible to assign US personnel to the French Staff then it is imperative that the US logistic officers be kept informed of the planned operations in order to effectively and efficiently support those operations. Furthermore, the French and the MAAG should meet and agree on approved T/O&Es for all units including tactical, sector and static units, and the MAAG must be advised immediately of changes or revisions to the approved T/O&Es.
INVENTORIES: No firm information is available on actual inventory positions as of any given date and actual deliveries from MDAP are not known in many areas. The Air Force, for example, does not have actual delivery information on MDAP ammunition. This is due to such things as: (1) No manifest being forwarded with shipments; (2) shipments arriving and unloading without knowledge of MAAG, etc. No information is available as to French contributions of end items or deliveries from off-shore procurement. The inventories as submitted by the French for the cost study vary as much as 50% plus or minus from the inventories contained in the MAAG records.
As illustrated in Table 1, the status of inventories is not firm. The table compares asset data as of 31 December 1953 available at the MAAG with that presented by the French in their Paris report to DCE. There is no consistent pattern or explanation as to the variation existing between the two sets of stated assets, since for some items such as the carbine and 81mm mortar the MAAG assets are double those stated by the French, while for the rifle and light machine gun, for example, the French indicate assets double those stated by the MAAG. It should be recognized that the MAAG does provide for combat losses oor for OSP and indigenous financed shipments of end items to Indochina. This table indicates that without the complete knowledge
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