NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET
-2- #4508, May 28, 8 p.m., from Paris
undertake these Franco-US military negotiations in Washington at the same time or parallel with 5-power military talks. If so, he said he felt it was most important that Ely attend and he would so inform Pleven, who, he was sure, would agree. He requested a prompt answer so French could take necessary decision as to whether or not to send Ely. He said French had been anxious for some time to initiate these military discussions and he hoped that US was now ready and willing for them to begin.
During course of my visit he had a telephone conversation with Massigli in London regarding a telegram which Massigli had sent reporting on British attitude regarding Southeast Asia Pact. Schumann showed me the telegram, key portion of which indicated British reluctance, as expressed by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick to undertake any sort of military operations in any portion of Indochina, as they thought that all Indochina, including Cambodia, was infested with Communists and so it was not practical for military operations. Schumann was quite upset by this telegram which he made clear to Massigli on the telephone, saying it was now clear that British were only interested in defending Southeast Asia when question became an immediate problem of the Defense of Malaya. Schumann then brought up another question which he said was giving great concern to Pleven. This was possibility of Chinese air attack on the delta. He said that French Air Force has informed Pleven that Chinese Communist planes operating from present bases had capability of remaining over Hanoi for 15 minutes. This would be enough time to cause great destruction and Pleven felt that it such an attack were not opposed immediately by US jets, Communists in 3 to 5 days could cause enough damage to make the delta effectively indefensible. Schumann wondered whether something along following lines might be possible. Provided French decided to strongly reinforce the delta and use conscripts in Indochina, could the President go to Congress and ask for discretionary authority to use US air power to defend the delta if it should be attacked by Chinese Communist planes. A request to Congress coming after the event would necessarily cause a few days delay which, in Pleven's view would be fatal. Schumann thought present United Action Program might not be ready in time as he did not know what if any progress US was making with other powers in order to satisfy point 2B of conditions posed in DEPTEL 4023.
I told Schumann naturally I could venture no opinion as to whether the President would be able to make such a limited request for discretionary authority but that from my personal knowledge of Washington thinking I felt that it would be absolutely necessary in any event that French take action along lines of paragraph 3 of DEPTEL 4272 regarding clarification of independence of Associated States.
