Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3b.djvu/180

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

 

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SUMMARY OF PLANNING BOARD ANNEX TO ITS REPORT ENTITLED, "NSC ACTION NO. 1074-a"

1. Problem: To assess risks, requirements, and consequences of alternate forms of US military intervention in Indochina. The objective of intervention is, in the absence of overt Chinese Communist intervention, destruction of organized Viet Minh forces by military action.

2. Nuclear weapons: Nuclear weapons will be available for use as required by the tactical situation and as approved by the President. Estimated force requirements contained in this paper are based on assumption of such availability.

3. Alternative A: Commitment of US forces in concert with the French.

a. Military requirements: Assuming military situation is approximately as at present, US military requirements would be:

(1) Ground Forces: None, provided that French Union forces afford adequate security for the forces in Indochina.

(2) Naval Forces: 1 Carrier Task Group, plus additional supporting units.

(3) Air Forces: 1 fighter wing, 1 light bomber wing, 1 troop carrier , 1 tactical control squadron, 1 tactical reconnaissance squadron.

b. Logistic requirements: Case I can be logistically supported without particular difficulty. As the training of Indigenous forces is crucial to the success of this operation, the US must be prepared to support a training program for 330,000 Indigenous troops, an increase of 100,000 over present forces.

c. Political aspects: The French would prefer a solution which did not involve US military participation, but would not seriously oppose same. The Associated States would welcome US intervention if given appropriate security guarantees. The Free World would generally support this action.

d. Free World reaction to US tactical use of nuclear weapons: Our Allies would probably disapprove if nuclear weapons were used without their being consulted, but if consulted would generally approve their use tactically.

e. Soviet bloc reaction: Generally Soviet reaction would be the same as though the US were assuming unilateral responsibility. The chances are about even that in this situation Communist China would decide upon overt intervention rather than accept the defeat of Viet Minh. If US use of nuclear weapons should lead to impending Viet Minh defeat, chances are better than even that the Chinese Communist would not openly intervene.

f. Foreign aid considerations: Military assistance would continue at approximately current rates: i.e., FY-54, $800 million; FY-55, $1130 million. Economic assistance would be substantially increased over present rate of $25 million per year.

4. Alternative B: In concert with the French and others.

a. Military requirements: Same as in Case 1, although allied air or naval forces might substitute for US forces.