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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 108. | The present acute crisis prevents successful debate on the European Defense Community (EDC) proposal in the French Parliament. Any attempt to force a vote would lead to postponement or defeat of EDC. If the Laniel government falls because of Indochina, EDC will likely get buried for good. Paris 4440 to Dulles, 19 May 1954 | 472 |
| 109. | Secretary Stevens emphasizes the Army's concern over high-level official views that "air and sea forces alone could solve our problems in Indochina" and that the complex nature of these problems would require a major logistical effort -- "it explodes the myth that air and sea forces could solve the Indochina problems." Secretary of the Army Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 19 May 1954 | 475 |
| 110. | The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that U.S. military participation in Indochina be limited primarily to naval and air forces. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 May 1954 | 477 |
| 111. | The JCS recommend against a "Korea-type" defense of Southeast Asia as unsound. Accordingly, the U.S. "should adopt the concept of offensive actions against the 'military power of the aggressor,' (in this instance, Communist China) rather than local reaction to the attack. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 May 1954 | 480 |
| 112. | General Smith cannot understand why the JCS downgraded U.S. military representation on the five-power staff conference because the Russians and Chinese must have known "we really intended serious business." DULTE 100, 23 May 1954 | 483 |
| 113. | The U.S. feels, as a minimum, France and Vietnam should sign draft Treaty of Independence, France should indicate "equal and sovereign" status of French Union states, and declare withdrawal of French Expeditionary Forces as soon as possible. Dulles to Paris 4272, 26 May 1954 | 484 |
| 114. | The JCS point out their belief that, from the U.S. point of view with reference to the Far East, "Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and allocation of more than token U.S. armed forces in Indochina would be a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities." JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 26 May 1954 | 487 |
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