Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3b.djvu/269

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
OUTGOING
TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
03630
TOP SECRET
1954 MAY 11 PM 4:09
SENT TO: Amembassy Paris NIACT 4023
EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY
RPT Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL 54
EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY
REURTEL 4287 and our 4017

1. We fully realize need for prompt decisions regarding internationalizing the war. Various factors combine to suggest that it may be premature to pose issue of internationalizing for decision at this moment.

(a) If raised before French realize fully that choice is between internationalizing and virtual surrender, proposal to internationalize might well be rejected, leaving no alternative but capitulation.

(b) British are more likely to support or acquiesce in intervention if Geneva has been shown to offer no prospect of solution.

(c) Australian government would almost certainly not take a position until after elections at end of May.

Even so it seems desirable for Laniel to know in general terms conditions we would require for intervention because of influence on current French decisions in military field in Indo-China and in political field in Geneva.

46185
2. President

Drafted by:

JED/ma 5-11-54
SS/S:JCK/

Approved by President Eisenhower

451


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