NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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-2- 4766, June 9, noon from Paris
Paragraph 4. No difference. Schumann however pointed out the great importance of this change of wording as "the end of hostilities" could well be interpreted to mean a state of armistice, whereas what was really meant was that troops should only be withdrawn after peace had been established. The whole Viet Minh effort has been to reach some sort of armistice that would force the withdrawal of the French troops and leave the country to them.
Paragraph 5. No difference. However, Schumann stated that he had told Bidault prior to his interview with Under Secretary that he felt that new language suggested by French was too broad and that US would require more specific pledge. Bidault reported that Schumann had guessed wrong as Under Secretary had seen no (repeat no) difficulties in proposed language pointing out that conditions named in new draft were inherent in sovereignty of any great power. Bidault also reported Under Secretary had said he would refer this language to Department for final decision.
Paragraph 6. No difference.
Schumann then stated that in view of meeting of minds between Bidault and Under Secretary he was sure that with the possible exception of new wording suggested in paragraph 5 of DULTE 156, there were no. (repeat no) political differences between us. He then said that he had just received a very disturbing cable from Bonnet. Before he could read it to me a call came through on the telephone from Bonnet in which they talked further about the same subject.
Subject is Valluy's negotiations regarding use of US Marines. Valluy has reported to Pieven and Bonnet that it is very doubtful if US would agree in any circumstances to sending a Marine division to Indochina. I pointed out to Schumann that US response on this subject had never been blanket pledge to use Marines but had only stated that their use would not (repeat not) be excluded provided an agreed upon war plan required their presence. I further said that it would depend upon the war plan which Valluy submitted as to whether or not our JCS would be convinced that Marines should be committed. Schumann said he fully understood this and would explain it further to Pleven, but no emphasized crucial importance this matter.
Comment: As I pointed out in EMBTEL 4503 French military have assumed that any war plan which was satisfactory to our JCS would show necessity for the use of at least one Marine division. While from our point of view this problem quite properly should be judged on its military merits, we must realize that it also has strong political aspects here and that French Parliament in my opinion will not (repeat not) in any circumstances vote to ask
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