Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3b.djvu/31

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

 

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e. Re-examine current national strategy with respect to Indochina, taking advantage of any unifying forces existing in Southeast Asia as a whole in opposition to the spread of Soviet Communism, and treating Southeast Asia as a unit with due regard to the long term objectives of the U.S. and France in the area. For further discussion, see Appendix "C."

Discussion: The Soviet Communist campaign in Southeast Asia is waged on a regional and coordinated scale, rather than separate attacks on individual countries By forming new coalitions of Western oriented countries, certain opportunities can be expected to open up which will directly support operations in Indochina.

f. Increase the pace and scope of the U.S. information program, and the U.S. advisory activities in furtherance of the French and Associated States military psychological warfare effort in accordance with the recommendations of the senior U.S. officers on the ground. (See Appendix "D"). Consideration should be given to both unilateral action and action in conjunction with colonial French military and civil authorities, as well as indigenous leaders of Southeast Asia. The objectives should b e to increase:

(1) Th e willingness of the people of France and the U.S. to support the prosecution of the war.

(2) The anti-Communist attitudes and active participation of the native populations.

(3) The morale of the French forces in Indochina.

Discussion: To secure the maximum benefits of our program of assistance to Indochina and, simultaneously, Southeast Asia by the cumulative and cooperative efforts of all propaganda media at the disposal of the Allies.

g. To render maximum and expeditious assistance in providing materiel and training to the French and Associated States Forces engaged in the Indochina war, the Services should b e directed to accomplish (1) and (4) below and authorized to accomplish (2) and (3) below:

(1) Expedite shipment of undelivered items on FY 50-54 Programs in accordance with priority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for deliveries of MDAP.

(2) Make changes in current programs as requested by Chief, MAAG, Indochina, and make deliveries against such changes and, if deemed necessary, without prior reference to or approval of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

 

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