Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3b.djvu/249

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET

wrangle characterized by steadfast Communist adherence to an inflexible position on important issues and by repeated substantive concessions by the French. Moreover, experience in Korea indicates that regardless of the military and administrative controls which might be embodied in the armistice conventions, it is certain that the Communists would flagrantly evade, circumvent, and violate the agreements to suit their ultimate purpose of subjugating all of Indochina. Even though, the Communists should agree to international control machinery, Communist practices would render it impotent, as in the case of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea.

4. Based on past performance, it is doubtful that the Communists would enter into a preliminary agreement to refrain from new military operations during the course of armistice negotiations. On the contrary, it is more likely that they would intensify military operations during negotiations in order to enhance their negotiating position, whereas the French would be under strong compulsion to avoid casualties during the negotiating period.

TOP SECRET

432