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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. D.

1 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Consideration of the ROK Offer to
Send a Division to Indochina


1. In two messages, C-66980 dated 2 February 1954 (DA IN 36799) and KCG 2-4 dated 5 February 1954 (DA I N 37583), CINCFE has reported President Rhee's proposal, subject to United States concurrence, to offer a Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) division to assist the Government of Laos in resisting the Viet Minh invasion of that country. In discussing this matter with General Hull on 5 February 1954, President Rhee stated that he did not wish to make any move which would be embarrassing to the United States Government and that he would do whatever the United States Government desired him to do in this case. He felt that early action should be taken if any reinforcements are to be sent to Indochina, as the situation there appeared to him to be quite critical. He stated that, in his opinion, whatever decision is taken should be taken quickly.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the implications of this problem, and submit herewith their views in the premises.

3. Provided the withdrawal of a ROKA division from the United Nations forces in Korea for transfer to Indochina did not bring about a general movement on the part of our United Nations Allies to reduce their contingents in Korea, such a withdrawal would be acceptable from the standpoint of the military situation in Korea.

4. The augmentation of the French Union forces in Indochina by one ROKA division would not, of itself, increase their military capability vis-a-vis the Viet Minh to a degree likely to be decisive.

5. In addition to the purely military considerations, there are involved a number of import ant political and psychological factors having military implications which should be carefully weighed in evaluating the over-all

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SecDef Cont. No. 2572

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