NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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SUMMARY OF SECTION IV
STUDY BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
This study is based on the assumption that there will be no concurrent U.S. involvement in Korea. It points out that from the point of view of the U.S., Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and that, consequently, the committing to the Indochina conflict of naval forces in excess of a Fast Carrier Task Force and supporting forces, as necessary in accordance with the developments in the situation, or basing substantial air forces in Indochina, will involve mal-deployment of forces and reduced readiness to meet probable Chinese Communist reaction elsewhere in the Far East.
Assuming the Chinese Communists intervene, we should, inter alia, employ atomic weapons, when ever advantageous, conduct air operations against military targets in Indochina, China, and Communist-held offshore islands, blockade the China coast, seize or neutralize Hainan, and have Chinese Nationalist forces undertake operations against the mainland. In accordance with the Unified Command Plan, CINCPAC would exercise unified command of assigned forces. To train Associated States Forces, approximately 2,250 U.S. personnel would be required to augment the existing MAAG. Meanwhile, action should be taken to insure an appropriate degree of U.S. mobilization to provide for the greater risk of a general war, and we should undertake to strengthen those allies who could directly support the U.S. strategic concept for a general war.
In the event the Chinese Communists do not intervene, we should, inter alia, conduct air operations in support of allied forces in Indochina, employing atomic weapons if such a course appears militarily advantageous. Although the Allied Commander-in-Chief should be French, there should be a U.S. Deputy and a U.S. Air Adviser. CINCPAC would exercise command over all U.S. forces based in Indochina and other forces assigned to him for operations in Indochina. The plan for training native troops would be the same as under the assumption of Chine s e Communist intervention.
Whether or not the U.S. intervenes in Indochina, the UCS consider that it is vital that the war in Indochina be financed by a method separate and distinct from the world-wide MDAP.
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