NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| Control: | 7250 |
| Rec'd: | December 16, 1954 |
| 10:02 p.m. |
| FROM: | Saigon |
| TO: | Secretary of State |
| NO: | 2303, December 16, 7 p.m. |
PRIORITY
SENT NIACT PARIS 724; PRIORITY DEPARTMENT 2303
DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE EYES ONLY HENSEL, DAVIS AND JCS
DEPARTMENT EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY AND ROBERTSON
PARIS EYES ONLY SECRETARY STATE, SECRETARY DEFENSE AND RADFORD
FROM COLLINS
Re EMBTELs 1830, 2108, 2250, Department 2285 (paragraph 8)
repeated Paris 602, 665, 706, 717.
1. Decision of Diem not to appoint Quat Defense Minister is final development that convinces me that Diem does not have the capacity to unify divided factions in Vietnam, and that unless some such action is taken as indicated in paragraph 7 below, this country will be lost to communism. Reasons for Diems decision probably compounded of (1) unwillingness to delegate control of Vietnam armed forces to any strong man; (2) fear of Quat as potential successor; (3) opposition of sects; (4) influence of brothers Luyem and Nhu; (5) desire to retain Minh in government.
2. Whatever the reasons, the failure to utilize Quat epitomizes lack of unity among Vietnamese and lack of decisive leadership on part of Diem. Minh refused to submerge his personal ambitions, even for a few months transition period under Quat or anyone else. Luyen again demonstrated his ability to cause Diem to reverse a decision already taken (Diem had told me prior to Luyen's return from Paris that he would appoint Quat). The veto power of the sects over any changes in the government that are likely to result in a weakening of their private domains has been confirmed. Another strong positive man, Quat, has been blocked from having a hand in reorganizing and controlling the armed forces. And all of these negative results have required a month of lengthy discussions, evasions of basic issues,
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