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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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-2-#2303, December 16, 7 pm., from Saigon

and wasted opportunities.

3. Minh is a good man, though young and inexperienced. O'Daniel feels that if Diem delegates full authority to Minh, the latter may be able to heal wounds of Diem-Hinh, Ty-Vy, Phan Rang-Phan Thiet affairs and bring stability end sanity to government-army relationships. But it is highly doubtful to me that Minh, or anyone else under present conditions, can create a single, cohesive national army from the five separate forces now existing–the Cao Daist, Hoa Hao, Binh Xuyen, national guard, and the present national army. With anticipated opposition from the sects and some from Diem himself, who is loathe to disband his own private force (national guard), it will take stronger leadership from Diem and Minh than either has shown to date to reduce and amalgamate these forces.

4. What is true of the armed forces is likely to be true in the resettlement of refugees and land reform. When I told Diem recently that our FOA people were having difficulty in getting down to business with the Vietnam agriculture officials, Diem reminded me that the Minister of agriculture is a Hoa Hao and the Hoa Hao are fearful of the effect of land reform on their extensive control of rice lands. Government officials hesitate to place refugees on French-owned rice lands or in the French-owned rubber plantations. And so on, one excuse for inaction after another.

5. Fact is that of the fine program of reforms announced by Diem in September, no definite progress has been achieved in converting words into deeds in any field.

6. I had hoped Diem would broaden and strengthen his cabinet by addition of Quat and perhaps even Bay Vien. Latter, despite his lurid past, has demonstrated organizing ability and his recently indicated desire to become "honorable" and to assist government. With Quat in government, Quat might have done much gradually to get sects in line and through his practical political ability have injected some flexibility and drive, both of which are now woefully lacking. At same time Quat might have acquired greater stature in public eye which might later have rendered him more eligible for higher post if later found necessary replace Diem. Unfortunately, this was probably deduced by brother Luyen and Diem also. I feel sure that fear of Quat's ability is at root of sects and Diem's opposition.

7. After weighing all available evidence, I am now convinced that in face of the positive threat of Ho Chi Minh's regime, it will take decisive action end dramatic leadership from Vietnamese themselves to save free Vietnam. Neither French nor Americans can substitute for such action and leadership. Apparently

821
the only


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