Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/355

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


TOP SECRET – Sensitive

Geneva and the ICC notwithstanding, to amalgamate the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) with the MAAG; action was initiated to obtain ICC concurrence. Early in May the press learned of this plan, and a story was published that "the US is doubling its military training staff in South· Vietnam and stepping up the training of Vietnamese troops for guerrilla warfare against Communist terrorists:" The release stated that:

"The decision reflects concern about the mounting strength and boldness of Communist bands which are raiding the villages and assassinating Vietnamese officials. However, US military and diplomatic officials said the Communist campaign is not a 'crisis' and in itself, is not likely to become a major threat to the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem. Guerrilla warfare specialists will be included among the 350 additional military trainee officers and men sent to Vietnam."

On 5 May 1960, the day this story was released, Senator Mansfield wrote, a letter to General Williams in Saigon quoting the press dispatch, and asking the General to explain:

"I do not mind telling you that I was personally very impressed with that portion of your testimony which suggested to me that you were directing the military aid program in a fashion which was, wisely, aimed at working MAAG 'out of a job' and that you had about reached the point where the scaling down could begin. Therefore, it came as something of a surprise to me to learn … that we intend to double the training staff of MAAG in Vietnam by adding to it 350 men."

General Williams' reply (MAAG Saigon, telegram to OSD/ISA, MAGCH-CH691, of 200711Z, May 1960) informed the Senator of the MAAG-TERM merger, but went on to say:

"It is my personal opinion MAAG should and can work itself 'out of job' with possible reduction approximately 15% in June 1961 and approximately 20% reduction yearly thereafter. Depending of course on readings taken at subsequent dates."

General Williams' ideas, however, were not integrated into the CIP. He left Saigon prior to the completion of the plan, and in any event the mounting intensity of the internal war precluded any further consideration of "phased withdrawal" before 1962.

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TOP SECRET – Sensitive