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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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personality and ability are impressive, Ho Chi Minh is regarded as a communist, and his regime on China's south border does not appear of critical importance. Stuart (Nanking) 2096 to Marshall, 18 October 1947 |
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| 75. | India hesitates to submit Indochina question to the UN because France could veto and the GOI is not convinced that Vietnam [Ho Chi Minh[ exercises de facto authority or represents majority viewpoint in Indochina. Marshall telegram to Consular Officers, 29 January 1948 | 116 |
| 76. | A Ho Chi Minh lieutenant is reported going to India with a petition for UN intervention. Marshall 21 to Saigon, 3 February 1948 | 117 |
| 77. | Hanoi Consul summarizes recent events centering on Bao Dai singing Bai d'Along conference accords, Bao Dai withdraws commitment and will stay in France until called for as "emperor." Rendall (Hanoi) 31 to Marshall, 19 February 1948 | 118 |
| 78. | French Government authorizes Bollaert to approve formation of a provisional Vietnamese government headed by General Xuan. Caffery 2567 to Marshall, 12 May 1948 | 120 |
| 79. | Xuan government arouses very little enthusiasm. Bao Dai is waiting for favorable signs to return. Stuart 971 to Marshall, 29 May 1948 | 121 |
| 80. | French indicate dubious chances of success for Xuan Government. Caffery 3063 to Marshall, 9 June 1948 | 123 |
| 81. | Chinese desire U.S. views on Ho Chi Minh's communist connections as an indicator of U.S. attitudes and ultimate policy vis-a-vis the Viet Minh. Stuart (Nanking) 1116 to Marshall, 22 June 1948 | 125 |
| 82. | U.S. position on Ho Chi Minh is that he is a communist with a well-known record in the Comintern, but no evidence of a direct link to Moscow. Marshall 974 to Nanking, 2 July 1948 | 127 |
| 83. | U.S. believes that given present world political and economic conditions, French cannot possible amass sufficient strength for a military solution to Indochina. Marshall 2466 to Paris, 3 July 1948 | 130 |
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