This page needs to be proofread.
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
| Page | ||
| 84. | Caffery suggests that U.S. inform the French that they are faced with alternatives of approving Viet independence, union of three KYS or losing Indochina. Caffery 3621 to Marshall, 9 July 1948 | 134 |
| 85. | U.S. approves Caffery's suggested action (tel 3621) and would publicly approve of French actions on Cochin-China status as a forward looking step toward settlement in Indochina, Marshall 2637 to Paris, 14 July 1948 | 135 |
| 86. | U.S. feels that France is evading the issue of altering the French Colony status of Cochin-China which, in effect, nullifies the Baie d'Along agreement. Marshall 2891 to Paris, 29 July 1948 | 136 |
| 87. | The French Assembly must face the issue of changing Cochin-China status and approve Baie d'Along agreements, if the little progress in Indochina is not to be nullified, is the view of the French Ministry of Overseas Territories. Caffery 4034 to Marshall, 5 August 1948 | 137 |
| 88. | U.S. seeks to determine, in the absence of firm commitments, how France can dispel Vietnamese distrust of French, split off adherents of Ho, or reduce hostilities. Marshall 136 to Saigon, 27 August 1948 | 138 |
| 89. | U.S. believes "nothing should he left undone which will strength truly nationalist groups" in the steadily deteriorating Indochina situation. Marshall 3368 to Saigon, 30 August 1948 | 140 |
| 90. | The U.S. publicly recognizes major strategem of communists in Southeast Asia is to champion the cause of local nationalism. Lovett 149 to Saigon, 22 September 1948 | 141 |
| 91. | U.S. policy statement on Indochina cites four long-term objectives in Indochina: (1) eliminate communist influence, (2) foster association of the people with Western powers, particularly France, (3) raise the standard of living, and (4) to prevent undue Chinese penetration. The immediate objectives is to satisfactorily resolve the French-Vietnamese impasse. Department of State Policy Statement on Indochina, 27 September 1948 | 143 |
| 92. | The U.S. view is that for Moscow "prospects are excellent that Ho Chi Minh will eventually force the withdrawal of the French and set up the first 'New Democratic Republic' in Southeast Asia." Abbot (Saigon) despatch No. 195 to SecState, 5 November 1948 | 150 |
xiv
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
