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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 1949 | ||
| 93. | The U.S., in assessing Bao Dai, cannot "irretrievably commit U.S. to support of native government which…might become virtually puppet govt…" Lovett (Acting SecState) 145 to Paris, January 1949 | 152 |
| 94. | The U.S. cautiously avoids any premature endorsement of Bao Dai in order to retain freedom of action in face of French pessimism. Acheson (SecState) 70 to Saigon, 2 May 1949 | 153 |
| 95. | Abbot, Saigon Consul, reviews the entire Indochina situation (for the New Delhi Foreign Service Conference, February 1949) for the State Department. "The alternatives to the Bao Dai solution are either continued costly colonial warfare of French withdrawal leaving a communist-controlled government in a strategic area of Southeast Asia." Abbott despatch 93 to SecState 5 May 1949 | 154 |
| 96. | The U.S. desires the success of Bao Dai experiment and will extend recognition, as there appears no other alternative to the established communist pattern in Vietnam and possible communist success in China. Acheson 77 to Saigon, 10 May 1949 | 190 |
| 97. | U.S. fears France is offering "too little too late" and the U.S. should avoid a "conspicuous position" of any kind. Acheson 83 to Saigon, 20 May 1949 | 193 |
| 98. | The U.S. feels that the question of Ho Chi Minh's nationalism versus communism is "irrelevant." "All Stalinists in colonial areas are nationalists." Acheson 14 Hanoi, 20 May 1949 | 196 |
| 99. | The U.S. submits comments on the 8 March Franco-Bao Dai agreement to France. Essentially, the U.S., while hoping the 8 March agreements would succeed, is pessimistic that the requisite concessions will be made by France. Butterworth, FEA, letter 289 to Bruce (Paris), 6 June 1949 | 200 |
| 100. | Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson requests the National Security Council to study the Asian situation to re-examine current policy. "The advance of communism in large areas of the world and particularly the successes of communism in China seriously affect the future security of the United States." Johnson Memo to NSC, 10 June 1949 | 217 |
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