Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 3. a.djvu/12

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

 

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

		Page
43.	The U.S. and France publicly announce the French resolve to carry out the declaration of independence for the Associated States and the approval of additional U. S. aid. State Press Release 529, 30 September 1953	167
44.	The U. S. is concerned at the "ill-considered action of the Vietnamese National Congress" and deplores the atmosphere of the National Congress which jeopardizes the war effort. Dulles 695 to Saigon, 21 October 1953	169
45.	President Eisenhower approves the statement of NSC 162/2 as basic national security policy which addresses the Soviet threat to U. S. security. NSC 162/2, 30 October 1953	171
46.	The U. S. informs France that their urgent request for early delivery of 25 additional C-47 aircraft for Indochina has received Presidential approval. Dulles 1930 to Paris, 23 November 1953	201
47.	France reassures the U. S. that the Ho Chi Minh interview, which is considered by Laniel as 98 percent propaganda, will not affect Indochina policy in any way. Laniel has "flatly refused" President Auriol's instructions to seek the earliest possible negotiations with Ho Chi Minh. Paris 2110 to Dulles, 30 November 1953	202
48.	General Navarre, CinC French Forces, Indochina, complains to General Trapnell that the aid requests prepared by the French have been modified by the MAAG before reaching Washington. "I cannot accept having my potential whittled away in such a manner.…" Navarre letter to Trapnell, 7 December 1953	203
49.	The CIA estimates the Chinese and Soviet reactions to U. S. intervention in Indochina with ground, air, and naval forces. It is anticipated that the Communist Bloc would not overtly intervene even though decisive defeat of the Viet Minh would result but would support and augment the Viet Minh to prolong the resistance. Special CIA Estimate, SE-53, 18 December 1953	206