NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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4. Our discussions with the French and Associated States military authorities were on all occasions conducted in an atmosphere of frankness and military comradeship. I myself was particularly frank in my discussions with General Navarre, and his deputy, General Bodet, as well as the Commanding Generals of North, Central and South Vietnam and the French Naval and Air Commander, in which discussions I stressed the need for: (a) wresting the military initiative from the enemy now, (b) immediately initiating the reorganization of French and Associated States Armies on a divisional basis, (c) reorganizing and improving the training of the Armies of the Associated States, (d) hastening the turnover of leadership and staff responsibilities, particularly on the divisional and regimental levels, to officers of the Associated States, and (e) improving the utilization of air and navy potential in Indochina. Prior to his departure from Paris (2 Jul 53), General Navarre presented me with a written plan of action, henceforth referred to as the "Navarre Plan" (see Annex "E"), and expressed himself orally along lines which assured me that he intends to take conclusive action toward achieving his goal.
5. Adequacy of Present Efforts and Plans to Win the War in Indochina: I feel confident that the anti-Communist military forces now in Indochina, with competent leadership and effective reorganization into regiments and divisions, are capable of achieving military victory against the forces currently arrayed against them. (Sea Annex "F" for discussion of opposing military forces) However, this would require a complete change in French military psychology associated with Indochina and would entail some risk, both military and political, in the redisposition of forces, which the French are unwilling to take.
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