Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 3. a.djvu/140

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Annex "I") With 2 exceptions the training was good, with American methods such as the "committee system" frequently used. The training witnessed in several training installations indicated out standing aggressiveness and imagination on the part of installation commanders. However, many training centers were operating at less than 50% capacity and suffered from lack of uniformity of instruction, lack of or failure to use necessary training aids, poor organization of instruction and lack of central command supervision.

18. Responsibility with respect to the training of the armies of the Associated States is poorly defined and I feel that the key to the training problem lies in reorganization to achieve real command supervision. This can be accomplished through the organization of a French MAAG, to supervise all training — Army, Navy, and Air, for the military forces of the Associated States, along the lines of our KAMAG in Korea. General Navarre has agreed to this concept. Furthermore, General Navarre has agreed to the inclusion of 3 U. S. officers in the French MAAG, with 2 French officers in turn working with General Trapnell's organization. This will allow for indirect U. S. participation in the training of the National Armies of the Associated States. I do not believe that direct U. S. participation in the training of the Armies of the Associated States is either desirable or feasible, primarily because it is unnecessary, manpower requirements would be very large and the French would object most strenuously.

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