Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 3. a.djvu/150

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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inland waterways. Blockade running is on a small scale. Small arms and ammunition is seldom found; rice and salt are the usual articles confiscated from Viet Minh junks and sampans (for details of Naval Warfare see Annex "R").

40. The training of Vietnamese naval officers and recruits was initiated in 1952 and the National Vietnamese Navy was officially established in January 1953. Training of enlisted men is satisfactory and can be expanded but training of officers is lagging due to the larger training cycle required. It was recommended that sore temporary officers be appointed from the group of several hundred enlisted men who have served in the French Navy. The French were not receptive. French naval officers appear to hold the Vietnamese in low esteem and are reluctant to turn over responsibility to them. The mission feels that the Associated States personnel can be developed into satisfactory leaders (see Annex "S" for further details on Vietnamese Naval Training).

41 Amphibious Operations: French Union amphibious operations have heretofore amounted to little more than patrol operations on the inland waterways and coastal raids. Both the Army and the Navy have river patrol forces which are not coordinated in the higher command structure. The French concept of amphibious operations makes an absolute distinction between operations conducted on the coastline and those conducted on the inland waterways. The U.S. concepts of the amphibious command structure; tactical integrity; and observance of the principles of choice of the objective and concentration of forces; and the adaptability of these concepts in Indochina were presented to the Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces, Far East (Admiral Auboyneau). These concepts, while not wholly

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