Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 3. a.djvu/199

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

operations designed to keep the enemy off balance", (b) reorganization into regiments and division-size units "is still in the planning stages", (c) there is "no sense of urgency in the training of senior Vietnamese commanders and staff officers", (d) the organization of a training command is awaiting the solution of "political problems" and (e) the "organization of the amphibious command has not gone beyond the planning stages".

4. In order to accurately present current views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State, it is suggested that a new memorandum dated 23 August 1953, which is being forwarded separately and which reflects the views expressed in the above paragraphs, be substituted for the memorandum of 11 August as an enclosure to your proposed memorandum to the Secretary of State. In addition, in order to point out more clearly that military success in Indochina is dependent upon the manner in which operations are conducted, it is recommended that the last paragraph of the draft letter to the Secretary of State (Enclosure) be changed as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"There is attached for your information a memorandum to me from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 11 August 1953 28 August 1953, which stated states that the present Navarre concept appears to correct the previously indicated weaknesses and from their viewpoint presents a marked improvement in French military thinking concerning operations in Indochina. Of course, the actual success of the operations in Indochina will be dependent upon the aggressiveness and skill with which the French and Vietnamese forces conduct their future operations. Accordingly Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe, as do I, that the necessary support should be provided to permit full an vigorous implementation of the Navarre concept, conditioned upon continued implementation of French support, demonstration of French intent by actual performance in Indochina, and continued French willingness to receive end act upon U.S. military advice. Further, the French should be urged at all levels to support and vigorously prosecute the Navarre concept to the maximum extent of their capabilities."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.


Enclosure

139

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION