Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 3. a.djvu/205

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

 

 

increased aid should be provided only if the French have made real progress in giving the natives greater independence.

b. If we are to give greatly increased support, the French must invite our close military advice in the conduct of the war in Indochina.

c. The French should give us renewed assurances regarding passage of the EDC.

d. He, the President, would not propose to call Congress back for an extra session to vote any additional funds for Indochina.

e. We might invite Daniel to visit the United States and be prepared to make a conditional committment regarding further support for Indochina operations.

5. Action on this matter was somewhat delayed by the general strikes in France, but on 1 September the State Department received further, more detailed information from the French (paragraph 7 below), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the French program, which is based on the "Navarre Plan" described to General O'Daniel when he visited Indochina some months ago. The JCS state (see Tab "C"), Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 28 August 1953).

a. "… a basic requirement for military success in Indochina is one of creating a political climate in that country which will provide the incentive for natives to support the French and supply them with adequate intelligence which is vital to the successful conduct of operations … If this is accomplished and the Navarre concept is vigorously pursued militarily in Indochina and given wholehearted political support in France, it does offer a premise of military success sufficient to warrant appropriate additional U.S. aid required to assist."

b. That information from Indochina indicates the French are not pursuing agreements reached between General O'Daniel and General Navarre as vigorously as expected. (Even more recent information from Saigon indicates some slight improvement, however,)

c. In light of the French slowness in following up the Navarre concept, additional U.S. support "should be conditioned upon continued implementation of French support, demonstration of French Intent by actual performance in Indochina, and continued French willingness to receive and act upon U.S. military advice."

 

TOP SECRET