NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
foreign military units. Therefore, in a very tentative way, it seems that the transfer of $285 million from NATO requirements to Indochina will not have a disastrously bad impact on NATO. It would be highly desirable to complete this review before acting finally on the Indochina proposal, in order to permit a better understanding of the impact on NATO and how to deal with it, but delay is not essential if the urgency of acting, in Indochina is great enough in the eyes of the Secretary of State.
10. FOA points out the high desirability of consulting with Congressional leaders concerning the Executive's intention to provide additional aid to Indochina. The hearings on this year's MSA programs brought out Congressional worries over the degree of U.S. involvement in financial support for Indochina. Such consultation, which we hear may be undertaken by the President himself, will require some time and may thus permit the better evaluation of the impact of the proposals on NATO and offshore procurement (per paragraph 9 above).
11. It is not yet known precisely what the State Department will recommend to the NSC for consideration. (Mr. Dulles is taking this matter up with the President and is not expected back in Washington until late on Monday, September 7). However, they may recommend NSC approval in principle for the provision of aid required to meet the French request, subject to:
- a. French agreement to the following conditions:
- (1) French to make every effort to achieve the elimination of the regular enemy forces.
- (2) French to promptly increase native and French Union forces in Indochina, and agree to carry on the campaign under the Navarre concept.
- (3) French to continue to pursue policy of generously and freely negotiating with the Associated States re their independence.
- (4) French to welcome continuing exchange of information and views with U.S. military, especially re intelligence and training.
- (5) The Indochina program will not entail any basic or permanent alteration of France's NATO plans and programs
- (6) End-item assistance required will be agreed upon in Saigon.
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