Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 3. a.djvu/262

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

751G.00/11-3053:SECRET FILE

Rec'd: November 30, 1953
6:23 p.m.


FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 2110, November 30, 7 p.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY

Laniel asks me to assure you and the President that Ho Chi Minh interview will not (repeat not), of itself, and certainly not (repeat not) pending full consultation at Bermuda, be permitted to affect in any way Indochina policy which he has followed since he became Prime Minister. He and Vidal consider interview 98 percent propaganda and recognize that it has already had great effect both in France and Indochina and will make continuation of their policy considerably more difficult. Laniel is nevertheless confident that he can keep his governments support without going further in direction of negotiations than he did in his November 24 statement (Embassy's telegram 2055, November 25). He did not (repeat not), speculate as to what situation might be under another government in January. Navarre has reported belief that in six months he should be able to achieve major improvement in military situation, including particularly cleaning up south. I reminded them of very long time which had elapsed between first hint and actual opening of Korean truce negotiations and of importance to any eventual negotiations of first obtaining best possible military position.

As indicative of pressure here Vidal subsequently told mo that President Auriel had summoned Laniel at 3:00 this morning and told him to consult representatives of three Associated States immediately with view to seeking earliest possible opening of negotiations with representatives of Ho Chi Minh. Laniel had flatly refused and said that he had no (repeat no), intention of changing his policy, at least until he had consulted US and UK at Bermuda and then Associated States.

Despite Laniels unquestioned sincerity on this, his November 24 statement left considerable latitude for negotiations and we must remember both the very heavy pressure which the Ho interview will unquestionably stimulate and the fact that Laniel government must constitutionally resign in mid-January.

JEF:MEJ/25
ACHILLES

CONFIDENTIAL

202