Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 3. a.djvu/84

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

TOP SECRET
21 April 1953


MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Proposed French Strategic Plan for the Successful Conclusion of the War in Indochina.


1. With reference to your memorandum, dated 2 April 1953, subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposed French plan for concluding the war in Indochina and submit herewith their comments (Appendix) and recommendations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff point out that the French plan was not presented in writing. The present knowledge of this plan is limited to that obtained through the minutes of oral presentations by M. Letourneau and General Allard, supplemented by questions related thereto during subsequent discussions.

2. While the French plan as presented was lacking in detail, certain weaknesses are indicated which are summarized briefly as follows:

a. It does not appear to be sufficiently aggressive.
b. Excessive effort appears to be devoted to cleaning up Viet Minh pockets without sufficient consideration being given to cutting the enemy's supply lines, particularly in Northern Indochina.
c. It appears that insufficient emphasis is given to placing of responsibility in the hands of the Vietnamese and the training of leaders therefor.
d. The plan appears to relay extensively on small-unit operations.

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the French plan could be improved in light of the foregoing comments, they feel that the plan is workable. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that augmentation of Vietnamese forces will be necessary in order to bring the conflict in Indochina to a successful conclusion.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

24
SecDef Cont. No. 03223