NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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meetings being broken up, we should have a lot of discussion so that the public relations can be properly prepared. We would also get the benefit from the Indian resolution. Mr. Lloyd hoped there would not be an instruction of the U.S. Government to the UN Command of which others would be given very little advance notice. If the talks are going badly, then we want to be very careful how they are broken up.
In conclusion, Mr. Lloyd summarized his position by saying that in his view disarmament should wait, Germany should wait, and that Austria might well be tried. He was most worried, he said, about how Indochina fitted into the picture. It would be very helpful for us to discuss how we see the Indochina campaign developing and what action in the political field we can take to help the French government. He did not quite see how it fits into the picture of how we are to deal with the Soviet Union.
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As regards the question whether Germany or disarmament should first be discussed, let it be supposed that It were Germany. In that case, M. Bidault was not sure whether the influence of public opinion in Germany and In France would not become very strong. There are those who think the German danger as big as the Russian danger. If Germany were then neutralized, we would have a vacuum at the center of the Continent. There would be great difficulty in refusing a proposal which would keep Germany disarmed. On the other hand, if we make disarmament the positive test this difficulty would not exist. M. Bidault was not against other tests, as in the case of Austria. It is not a French expert who has said that Russia might accept the western proposal for free elections. Germany would in effect be put up for auction with both sides bidding for her, and we would be caught in our own trap.
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