THE MILITANT TYPE OF SOCIETY, 771
evidences of his regulative action over men's lives ; and these gener- ate the idea that his power is boundless. Unlimited faith in govern- mental agency is fostered. Generations brought up under a system which controls all affairs, private and public, tacitly assume that af- fairs can only thus be controlled. Those who have experience of no other regime become iinable to imagine any other rec/hne. In such societies as that of ancient Peru, for example, where, as we have seen, regimental rule was universal, there were no materials for framing the thought of an industrial life spontaneously carried on and spon- taneously regulated.
By implication, there result repression of individual initiative and a consequent lack of private enterprise. In proportion as an army becomes organized it is reduced to a state in w^hich the independent action of its members is forbidden. And, in proportion as regimenta- tion pervades the society at large, each member of it, directed or re- strained at every turn, has little or no power of conducting his busi- ness otherwise than by established routine. Slaves can do only what they are told by their masters ; their masters can not do anything that is unusual without official permission ; and no permission is to be obtained from the local authority until superior authorities through their ascending grades have been consulted. Hence the mental state generated is that of passive acceptance and expectancy. Where the militant type is fully developed, everything must be done by public agencies ; not only for the reason that these occupy all spheres, but for the further reason that, did they not occupy them, there would arise no other agencies the prompting ideas and sentiments having been obliterated.
There must be added a concomitant influence on the intellectual nature which cooperates with the moral influences just named. Per- sonal causation is alone recognized, and the conception of impersonal causation is prevented from developing. The primitive man has no idea of cause in the modern sense. The only agents included in his theory of things are living persons and the ghosts of dead persons. All unusual occurrences, together with those usual ones liable to vari- ation, he ascribes to supernatural beings. And this system of inter- pretration survives through early stages of civilization ; as we see, for example, among the Homeric Greeks, by whom wounds, deaths, and escapes in battle, were ascribed to the enmity or the aid of the gods, and by whom good and bad acts were held to be divinely prompted. Continuance and development of militant forms and activities main- tain this way of thinking. In the first place it indirectly hinders the discovery of causal relations. The sciences grow out of the arts begin as generalizations of truths which practice of the arts makes manifest. In proportion as processes of production multiply in their kinds and increase in their complexities, more numerous uniformities come to be recognized ; and the ideas of necessary relation and physi-