procedure, which not only does not have a detrimental effect, but, on the contrary, is absolutely necessary in order to facilitate the work of the higher leader."
General von Scherff states:[1]
"It would contribute to clearness and to proper division of responsibility if the regulations would definitely prescribe:—
"1. That only the superior commander who makes dispositions for battle according to his own judgment, be charged with assigning appropriate missions;
"2. That the subordinate leader, charged with the execution of a mission, determine, by an independent choice of any expedient provided by the regulations, the formation in which his organization is to carry out the task assigned; and, finally,
"3. That the subsequent conduct of such an organization be governed by a definite normal procedure, familiar to the men from the drill-ground, so as to ensure mutual coöperation of its component parts."
2. CONCENTRATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEPLOYMENT FOR ACTION.[2]
Column tactics, which influenced us even after the Franco-German war, required that troops be concentrated, prior to an action, from the narrow route column into a broad combat formation. This tedious systematic concentration[3] was invariably employed before entering an action, except when, in critical situations, companies and battalions had to be launched into the fight directly from route column. The commander of a force could reduce the time required for going into action only by approaching the field of battle in assembly formation.[4]
- ↑ Einheitsangriff oder individualisierter Angriff, Berlin, 1902.
- ↑ Aufmarsch, Entfaltung, Entwicklung.
- ↑ "By concentration is meant the passage from route column to a broader close order formation. It is employed for the purpose of decreasing the depth of a column and for assembly." (Par. 315 German I. D. R.)
- ↑ Examples: The approach of the IInd Army to the battlefield of Gravelotte, see Taktik, III, p. 305. The advance of the 1st Army from its cantonments toward the Bistrits to the battlefield of Königgrätz was a mistake. The army first approached in route columns, then concentrated, again formed route columns, and finally concentrated for action. v. Lettow-Vorbeck, II, pp. 407 and 480. From what I know of the terrain the advance should in this case have been made in assembly formations.
